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ERIE’S FOUR FUNCTIONS: REFRAMING CHOICE
OF LAW IN FEDERAL COURTS
Allan Erbsen*
ABSTRACT
This Article seeks to mitigate decades of confusion about the Erie doctrine’s purposes, justifications, and content. The Article shows that “Erie”
is a misleading label encompassing four distinct components. Jumbling these
components under a single heading obscures their individual nuances.
Analyzing each component separately helps to clarify questions and values
that should animate judicial analysis. The Article thus reconceptualizes the
Erie doctrine, offers a more precise account of how Erie operates, and provides a framework for rethinking several foundational aspects of Erie
jurisprudence.
2013 marks Erie’s seventy-fifth anniversary. The years have not been
kind to Erie and its progeny. Decades of jurisprudence have produced as
much consternation as enlightenment. Successive generations of students
and lawyers have struggled to understand an ever-expanding constellation of
opaque precedents. Even mentioning the word “Erie” can invoke feelings of
dread. That reaction is unfortunate because the issues that Erie confronts
are vitally important and endlessly fascinating. Erie addresses the relationship between governments in a federal system, the division of powers within
governments, and the essential elements of the rule of law. So how did a
doctrine this central to the constitutional order become a morass of often
inscrutable decisions?
Confusion arises in part because what courts and commentators label
“the Erie doctrine” comprises four distinct sets of inquiries serving four dis© 2013 Allan Erbsen. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. Thanks to Michael
Greve, Jill Hasday, Michael Paulsen, Kim Roosevelt, Jay Tidmarsh, and participants in
the Loyola University Chicago School of Law Constitutional Law Colloquium, the
American Enterprise Institute Colloquium on Erie, Notre Dame Law School’s
Conference on The Constitution and Unwritten Law, the University of St. Thomas
Law School Faculty Workshop, and the University of Minnesota Law School Faculty
Workshop for helpful comments.
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tinct functions. Erie governs: (1) the creation of federal law; (2) the interpretation of its scope; (3) the prioritization of federal law relative to state law;
and (4) the adoption of non-federal law when federal law is inapplicable.
These four inquiries collectively help courts make three kinds of decisions
when analyzing choice of law. Courts must determine: (1) which government is an authoritative source of law for a particular dispute; (2) which
institution within that government is authoritative; and (3) which rule that
institution would endorse. Bundling these distinct functions and choices
into a single expansive “Erie” doctrine shrouds decisionmaking in a haze of
generalities. Fragmenting Erie into its components highlights how different
concerns and criteria are relevant in different contexts, which in turn can
help resolve a wide variety of theoretical and practical problems.
The Article provides new insights into several recurring doctrinal puzzles. For example, it considers how choice of law rules in federal court are a
form of federal common law and whether Klaxon is an appropriate federal
common law rule, which types of state institutions federal diversity courts
should emulate and thus whether federal courts should attempt to predict the
decisions of a state’s highest court, the extent to which federal courts can
create common law that incorporates general law (including customary international law), what default rules should guide interpretation of federal laws
that might conflict with state laws, and the distinction between statutory and
common law under the Supremacy Clause and Hanna’s “twin aims” test.

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. ERIE’S FUNCTIONS: CREATION, INTERPRETATION,
PRIORITIZATION, AND ADOPTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Background Principles Shaping the Role that Erie Performs .
1. Basic Elements of the Rule of Law in a System of
Divided Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Complications in the United States Federal System
3. The Distinction Between Choosing Governments,
Institutions, and Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Swift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Erie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. An Illustration of Erie in Operation: Standard Oil . . . . . . .
E. Synthesis of Erie’s Central Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. ERIE’S ASSUMPTIONS: A THRESHOLD INQUIRY INTO THE
DOCTRINE’S UNDERLYING VALUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. The Puzzle of Positive Constraint: The Constitution and the
Rules of Decision Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. The Puzzle of Non-Positive Constraints: Is Erie a Brooding
Omnipresence? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. ERIE’S IMPLEMENTATION: RETHINKING DOCTRINAL PUZZLES . .
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins1 is
far more famous and influential than it is clear and informative.
Although more than 16,000 judicial decisions and 5,700 law review
articles have cited Erie,2 the opinion provides thin support for its reasoning and little guidance about its implications.
Weaknesses in the opinion have become more troubling as the
word “Erie” has evolved from a case name into a doctrinal label. A
widely accepted rule emerging from Erie is that “[t]here is no federal
general common law.”3 This emphatic and enigmatic departure from
1 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2 These figures arose from a search for “Erie /5 Tompkins” in Westlaw’s ALLCASES and JLR databases on October 1, 2013. (The search for cases must be done
for two sets of years to avoid the 10,000 opinion cap on search results.)
3 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. Other familiar statements in Erie are less widely accepted,
although modern readers must be sensitive to jurisprudential changes over the intervening decades. For example, Justice Brandeis obliquely suggested that even Congress might be powerless to regulate conduct along the defendant railroad’s track.
See id. “Although Congress [at the time] very likely did have power to make rules for
right of ways near railroad tracks when the railroad traffic on those tracks crossed
state lines (as was the case in Erie), Justice Brandeis’s assumption that large areas of
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precedent was sufficient to resolve the specific dispute before the
Court.4 But subsequent cases have presented myriad permutations on
Erie’s facts that the holding did not address. These cases have appropriated Erie as a malleable label encompassing concepts that extend
far beyond Erie’s narrow context. As this “Erie doctrine” has evolved, it
has become increasingly more complex and progressively less coherent. Courts and commentators agree that the Erie decision and the
ensuing doctrine are often inscrutable,5 but disagree about why,
when, and how.
Ambiguity has arisen in part because Erie’s imprecision and
importance have combined to transform the opinion into a mirror
that reflects the varying interests of its readers. To readers concerned
about federalism, Erie becomes a case about the allocation of power
between the national and state governments. To readers concerned
about separation of powers, Erie becomes a case about the proper role
of courts in the process of making law. To readers concerned about
the nature of legal authority, Erie becomes a case about the origins of
legal rules and proper methods for ascertaining their content. There
is enough grist in Erie to support each of these perspectives and
enough mystery to preclude endorsing any one of them over the
others.
The decision’s amenability to multiple interpretations has led
commentators to inflate Erie into an almost mystic emblem encompassing multiple aspects of lawmaking in a federal system.6 The “Erie”
label tends to obscure more than it clarifies as courts and commentators try to delve through layers of gloss in an effort to resolve specific
problems.
state tort law remained outside the regulatory province of the federal government was
probably accurate in 1938.” G. Edward White, A Customary International Law of Torts,
41 VAL. U. L. REV. 755, 809 (2006).
4 See infra Section I.C (discussing Erie’s facts).
5 See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, A Critical Guide to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 54
WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 922 (2013) (“From the standpoint of technical, lawyerly
craftsmanship, Justice Brandeis’s opinion has many vices.”); Suzanna Sherry, Wrong,
Out of Step, and Pernicious: Erie as the Worst Decision of All Time, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 129
(2011) (elaborating on the article’s title); Jay Tidmarsh, Procedure, Substance, and Erie,
64 VAND. L. REV. 877, 878 (2011) (“[W]ith nearly every case, the Court seems to correct course or careen in a different direction.”).
6 Rhetoric about Erie occasionally veers toward religious imagery. See Marian O.
Boner, Erie v. Tompkins: A Study in Judicial Precedent: II, 40 TEX. L. REV. 619, 635
(1962) (contending that Erie “has continued to gain stature until it is practically a
religion” whose adherents squash “heresy”); Philip B. Kurland, Book Review, 67 HARV.
L. REV. 906, 912 (1954) (referring to the “anti-Erie cult”).
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A better approach is to puncture Erie’s mystique by recognizing
that the Erie label encompasses several doctrines that are best understood separately. Isolating each subsidiary doctrine eliminates distractions, highlights salient questions, and helps illuminate new ways of
thinking about recurring puzzles that have befuddled courts for
decades.
Erie’s seventy-fifth anniversary is an opportune moment to reassess the ensuing doctrine’s basic premises and framework. The key to
understanding how the Erie doctrine should operate is to recognize
why it exists; doctrinal form follows doctrinal function. This Article
therefore approaches Erie from an atypical direction. Rather than
starting with a specific dispute and looking backward to Erie for guidance, I start by considering the kind of guidance that is necessary in
particular contexts. This approach identifies the role that the Erie
doctrine is attempting to play, which in turn allows for a refined
inquiry into how it can best fill that role in particular contexts.
Despite its imprecision, the Erie doctrine serves an essential function by governing the allocation of regulatory authority in a federal
system. The Constitution divides power among the federal and state
governments and between the federal legislative, executive, and judicial branches. States likewise allocate power among institutions with
varying degrees of authority to create and interpret state law. The
abundance of empowered lawmakers inevitably leads to conflicting
claims of regulatory authority. Mechanisms are necessary to resolve
these conflicts by determining which governments and which institutions are authorized to supply binding rules in particular circumstances. Erie is one such mechanism. If the Erie doctrine did not exist,
the Supreme Court would have to invent something like it. If the doctrine is dysfunctional, the Court should improve it.
The Article proceeds in four steps. Part I concludes that what is
commonly known as the “Erie doctrine” is really a composite of four
doctrines governing four distinct phenomena: creation of federal law,
interpretation of its scope, its prioritization relative to state law, and the
adoption of non-federal law when federal law is inapplicable. These
four doctrines collectively help courts make three kinds of choices,
rather than a single amorphous choice of “law.” Courts must choose
an authoritative government, an authoritative institution within that
government, and a rule that the institution would endorse. Part I also
situates Erie in a broader context by analyzing how federalism and separation of powers complicate choice of law and by identifying basic
“rule of law” values that animate choice of the law in the federal
system.
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Fragmenting Erie into its components and carefully parsing the
choice of law inquiry demystifies current doctrine by allowing for a
more precise account of the issues confronting courts in particular
cases. Parts II and III illustrate the utility of this precision. Part II
considers whether different values might animate Erie’s distinct components and guide courts confronting seemingly technical choice of
law questions. Part III then analyzes seven doctrinal puzzles that a
nuanced account of Erie helps to reveal and frame. For example, it
addresses when federal courts can rely on general law, whether federal courts must follow the choice of law rules of the state in which
they sit, and how federal courts should ascertain the content of state
law. This Part suggests answers to some recurring puzzles and provides a new context for others, laying a foundation for future scholarship reconsidering several longstanding precedents.
The Article thus proposes a new framework for considering the
functions that the Erie doctrine serves and the optimal methods for
implementing those functions. Peeling back the “Erie” label to reveal
the doctrine’s distinct components highlights questions and concerns
that cryptic precedents often obscure. The more precise account that
emerges unsettles central pillars of modern Erie jurisprudence.
I.

ERIE’S FUNCTIONS: CREATION, INTERPRETATION, PRIORITIZATION,
AND ADOPTION

Courts and commentators agree that Erie is a perplexing enigma.
But why? Conventional wisdom posits several reasons for Erie’s inscrutability. Erie promotes values that are either unclear or in conflict,
makes false assumptions, forces courts to draw undrawable lines
between substance and procedure, lacks a clear analytical structure,
requires considering abstract jurisprudential theories about the
nature of law, and is cited in myriad contexts that have no discernible
connection to Erie’s actual facts. Indeed, the Erie doctrine has transcended the Erie decision to become an amorphous concept permeating distinct fields of constitutional law. Erie has evolved to resemble
what it purported to reject: a “brooding omnipresence” hovering
above federal jurisprudence, moored only to tenuous judicial
rationalizations.7
7 Justice Holmes criticized loose pre-Erie conceptions of legal authority by
observing that “[t]he common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the
articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identified.” S. Pac.
Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Less than a decade
after Erie, Charles Clark applied the “brooding omnipresence” metaphor to Erie itself.
See Charles E. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v.
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These accounts of why Erie is confusing have some explanatory
value and influence my analysis in Part III. However, this Part
explores a simpler and surprisingly overlooked explanation for why
Erie seems inscrutable.
Confusion arises because what is commonly known as the Erie
doctrine encompasses four inquiries that serve four distinct functions.
Each inquiry should be understood as requiring its own doctrine (or
set of doctrines) to guide judicial analysis. Disentangling these subsidiary doctrines can illuminate how Erie operates, highlight puzzles
about its meaning, and provide insights for resolving those puzzles.
Erie’s four functions are to govern the creation, interpretation,
and prioritization of federal law, and the adoption of non-federal law.
Each of these terms has multiple meanings, but I am using them in a
specific sense.
When I discuss Erie’s role in the creation of federal law, I refer to
an inquiry about whether a particular institution is an authoritative
source for the federal rule it purports to announce. This aspect of
Erie applies most frequently when courts create federal common law,
but is also relevant when considering limits on the authority of all
institutions that create any kind of federal law.
I use interpretation to encompass an inquiry into a federal rule’s
scope. For example, what aspects of an issue does the rule address:
Does it create rights or also remedies? Does it govern collateral questions such as limitations periods, access to juries, and the availability of
class actions? And does it seek to supplement or instead displace state
law? Resolving these interpretative questions can determine whether
federal law potentially applies in a particular case and whether it conflicts with state law that might otherwise apply.
The term prioritization describes an inquiry into the choice among
conflicting laws. For example, if the creation inquiry concludes that a
federal law is valid, and the interpretation inquiry concludes that the
federal law encompasses a disputed issue, the prioritization inquiry
considers when (if at all) federal law would yield to a conflicting nonfederal law.8
Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 275 (1946) (“The question really at issue is not whether
there is not anywhere the brooding omnipresence of the common law, but just where
it shall be permitted to operate; and I think my subtitle fairly expresses the substitution we have made of one general abstraction for another.”).
8 The concept of “priority” incorporates traditional concerns that animate
choice of law doctrine but that generally do not appear in discussions of Erie. A notable exception is Kermit Roosevelt III, Choice of Law in Federal Courts, From Erie and
Klaxon to CAFA and Shady Grove, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 12 (2012) (“The court’s
task . . . is first to determine the scope of the different sovereigns’ laws, and then to
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Finally, I use the word adoption to address cases where a federal
court concludes either that federal law does not apply or that federal
law requires considering rules drawn from outside federal law. In
these cases the court must ascertain the content of law created by
exogenous sources while taking care not to distort that law. Excessive
distortion in the process of adopting a non-federal rule would in
effect create a new rule with a federal judicial origin. Assessing the
validity of that new rule would require a separate inquiry under Erie’s
creation component.
Adoption of non-federal law differs from the seemingly similar
phenomenon of incorporating non-federal law. In my lexicon, a
court or Congress “adopts” non-federal law when it concludes that
non-federal law must apply.9 There is never a specific non-federal law
that must apply of its own force. Instead, federal courts select particular non-federal laws using a federal choice of law rule.10 But the
“choice” addresses only which non-federal law to adopt. There is no
choice about whether to adopt a non-federal rule as governing law for a
particular dispute. Because the governing law must be non-federal,
federal courts lack discretion to alter it; otherwise they would convert
the non-federal law into a new federal law of their own creation.11
In contrast, a court or Congress “incorporates” non-federal law
when it concludes that federal law governs a particular issue, but need
not be nationally uniform.12 A nonuniform federal law may incorporate aspects of state law, creating what is formally a federal rule but
assign priority to one or the other if conflicts exist.”). My “interpretation” and “prioritization” labels track Professor Roosevelt’s reliance on “rules of scope” and “rules of
priority.” Id. at 18.
9 I therefore use the term differently than Henry Hart, who equated “adoption”
and “absorption” of law, such that federal adoption of a state rule converted the rule
into federal law that courts could interpret against a backdrop of federal interests.
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489,
529 (1954). I refer to the scenario Hart addressed as “incorporation” of state law,
which is a term he also used. Id. The Supreme Court has also used the terms interchangeably. See West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 309 (1987) (using
“adopted” and “incorporation” in adjacent sentences considering whether a federal
common law rule would mirror the content of state law). Different terminology can
apply when the phenomenon occurs in reverse, as when state law incorporates federal
standards. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308,
314 (2005) (considering when federal courts have jurisdiction over federal questions
“embedded” in state law).
10 See infra subsection III.D.1.
11 See infra subsection III.D.2.
12 See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728–29 (1979)
(holding that federal courts should borrow state law when there is “little need” for or
a risk of “disrupt[ion]” from a uniform national rule).
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functionally a state rule. Lawmakers are often unclear about whether
federal law adopts or incorporates state law.13 Whether the distinction matters depends on context. For example, if federal law incorporates state law rather than adopting it, then perhaps federal courts can
skew their interpretations of state law to accommodate federal interests.14 The distinction might also influence whether suits invoking
state law arise under federal law for jurisdictional purposes.15 Incor13 See infra Section III.A (discussing whether federal law might adopt or incorporate general law, including customary international law). For example, the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA) requires federal courts to resolve cases using state law without specifying whether the statute adopts or incorporates state law. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b)(1) (2006) (requiring district courts to determine liability “in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred”). A related ambiguity is
that the statute does not expressly indicate whether federal courts should apply state
law even if a state court would choose to apply federal law in an analogous suit against
a private defendant. See 31 FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYERS EDITION § 73:445 (1998)
(noting authority for both possibilities). In any event, the label describing the interaction between state and federal law is less important than the practical implications
of adopting a particular rule. As the Supreme Court explained in the course of articulating federal common law governing a military contract:
We refer here to the displacement of state law, although it is possible to
analyze it as the displacement of federal-law reference to state law for the
rule of decision. Some of our cases appear to regard the area in which a
uniquely federal interest exists as being entirely governed by federal law,
with federal law deigning to “borro[w],” or “incorporat[e]” or “adopt”, state
law except where a significant conflict with federal policy exists. We see
nothing to be gained by expanding the theoretical scope of the federal preemption beyond its practical effect, and so adopt the more modest terminology. If the distinction between displacement of state law and displacement of
federal law’s incorporation of state law ever makes a practical difference, it
at least does not do so in the present case.
Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507 n.3 (1988) (citations omitted).
14 See Paul J. Mishkin, The Variousness of “Federal Law”: Competence and Discretion in
the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 804 (1957)
(noting that “a decision to apply state law as a matter of federal incorporation does
not necessarily carry with it the obligation” to use the same “techniques” of interpretation as when “state law will apply because the court has no competence to do otherwise”). Incorporation (rather than adoption) of state law can create an interesting
reverse-Erie issue. If a federal court incorporates state law into federal common law
and then distorts its interpretation of state law to promote federal interests, then a
state court—even in the state from which the law was drawn—presumably must
respect the federal interpretation. See Michael Steven Green, Horizontal Erie and the
Presumption of Forum Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1237, 1281–83 (2011) (considering
potential limits on the authority of federal courts to modify incorporated state law).
For a broader discussion of how and why federal courts incorporate state law, see
Radha A. Pathak, Incorporated State Law, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 823 (2011).
15 See Lumen N. Mulligan, You Can’t Go Holmes Again, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 237,
262–66 (2012) (analyzing the basis for federal jurisdiction over FTCA actions).
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poration of non-federal law thus raises questions involving Erie’s creation and interpretation components that are distinct from questions
that arise under the adoption inquiry.
This Part explains why Erie should be understood as a composite
of the four subsidiary doctrines outlined above. Section A identifies
principles that shape the choice of law inquiry in federal court, while
Sections B, C, and D explain how the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
has incorporated those principles into doctrine. Section E then synthesizes the principles and jurisprudence while explaining that some
of the Erie doctrine’s components partially overlap.
A. Background Principles Shaping the Role that Erie Performs
Erie’s significance and challenging inscrutability have combined
to make it the Mount Everest of Supreme Court jurisprudence. Most
lawyers respect Erie from afar, but do not want to get too close. When
they venture near, they often find the terrain inhospitable and the
landscape shrouded in clouds. The Court’s opaque opinion in Erie
has for decades been an obstacle to understanding the doctrine that
the opinion creates. So for a moment I will ignore the opinion and
subsequent precedents that struggle to apply it.
Setting Erie and its baggage aside for the moment can help illuminate concepts that well-worn citations and jargon often conceal.
Rather than starting with doctrine and working backward to underlying principles, I will start with principles and work forward to doctrine. This approach highlights why various features of the federal
system required the Supreme Court to eventually confront the questions that the Erie doctrine addresses. The rest of the Article then
considers how well Erie addresses those questions and how a more
nuanced understanding of the questions might lead to more defensible answers.
My point here is not that the Erie decision was inevitable, but
rather that reconsideration of pre-Erie precedent—in some form or
another—was likely given evolving conceptions of the federal system
and the nature of law.16 Discussions about “Erie” would therefore still
occur even if the Erie decision did not exist. We would use different
words and invoke different sources, but the debate would continue.
A precise account of the Erie doctrine requires recognizing a few
basic principles about the nature of law in a federal system of divided
16 A thorough account of the developments undermining Swift and leading to
Erie is available in EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION (2000) and TONY FREYER, HARMONY AND DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT AND ERIE CASES
IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1981).
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powers that purports to follow what is often called “the rule of law.”
Theorists have for centuries disagreed about the nature of law and
what it means to follow the rule of law. That is not a debate I will
enter.17 Instead, subsection 1 identifies and synthesizes propositions
that are widely considered unobjectionable in the context of United
States law. Defending these basic propositions is a task for a different
article, but they are sufficiently well established to justify using them as
a foundation for reframing Erie. Indeed, I will show that Erie itself
implicitly relies on these propositions.
1. Basic Elements of the Rule of Law in a System of Divided Power
Six concepts are relevant to building a foundation for Erie in
background principles governing the rule of law: source, content,
scope, choice, conflict, and authority. First, legal rules have a source.
The source can vary. For example, rules might emerge from different
sovereigns, different institutions within particular sovereigns, customary practices, or private agreements. Theorists might even contend
that a rule emerges from the mind of the judge who writes an opinion
invoking it. But the rule comes from somewhere.
Second, legal rules have content. This content may be inscrutable
or indeterminate, but it is the essence of a rule and it is what judges
are attempting to discern when they apply the rule. Content might
vary as rules move through different institutions. Thus, the legislature
that is a rule’s initial source might understand the rule’s content differently than the court interpreting the statute, such that the rule as
applied is a blend of input from two sources: the legislature and the
court.18 Likewise, a rule might have different content in different
courts when different judges interpret it differently in similar cases.
Nevertheless, the task of judges purporting to interpret rules from
17 For a discussion of recent and historical efforts to define the rule of law, see
Robert Stein, Rule of Law: What Does It Mean?, 18 MINN. J. INT’L L. 293 (2009). Many
definitions of the rule of law include a normative standard to assess particular substantive laws. See, e.g., id. at 302 (proposing a definition that considers whether governments “protect[ ] the human rights and dignity of all members of society”). This
Article focuses on the narrower question of how laws are made rather than what ends
they promote. See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS,
THEORY 122 (2004) (noting that a desire to avoid arbitrary decisionmaking is a recurring theme in discourse about the rule of law).
18 One might characterize this change in two ways: the rule’s content remained
the same and the court misinterpreted it, or the rule’s content evolved based on institutional context. My argument does not depend on accepting either characterization. Both perspectives posit a deferential role for courts that differs by degree:
judges should strive either not to misinterpret content created by others or to alter
that content only in appropriate circumstances.
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exogenous sources is to identify a rule’s content to the best of their
ability using the analytical tools of their profession.19
Third, a rule’s content includes information about its scope, such
as the context in which it is relevant, in which territories it applies,
and which entities it regulates. Information about scope is often
implicit or embedded in ambiguous terms, which complicates efforts
to apply rules to novel circumstances. For example, consider the
seemingly clear text of the Fifth Amendment, which protects “any person” “in any criminal case” from being “compelled . . . to be a witness
against himself.”20 Among the interesting questions about the Fifth
Amendment’s scope is whether the privilege bars compelling defendants to testify in state court if the testimony could later be used against
them in federal court. The Court initially said no, and then reversed
course and said yes.21 Thus, even if we know what this aspect of the
Fifth Amendment is generally trying to accomplish—preventing compulsory self-incrimination—the text’s scope can be difficult to discern
in light of the existence of multiple legal systems.
Fourth, given that laws emanate from multiple sources, the content of legal rules with an ostensibly similar scope will frequently conflict as different sources develop inconsistent approaches to similar
problems. For example, Congress might enact a statute providing
that the maximum speed on all highways built with federal funds is
fifty-five miles per hour, while a state statute might provide that the
minimum speed on certain federally funded highways within the state
is sixty-five miles per hour. A single highway thus might fall within the
regulatory ambit of two inconsistent rules that different sources have
purported to apply.
Fifth, conflict between legal rules requires courts to make a choice
when multiple sources of law appear relevant. Courts often make
these choices explicitly. But even the absence of a formal choice is
itself a choice. If a court adopts a particular rule that conflicts with an
available alternative, the court has implicitly chosen not to apply the
alternative.
Finally, the rule of law ideal posits that some sources of law have a
stronger claim to authority than others. Treating a rule as binding in
19 If the rule is endogenous rather than exogenous—i.e., if the judge creates it—
the rule still must have content. Observers might question the legitimacy or merits of
that content, but the rule exists to the extent the court relies on it to justify a particular conclusion.
20 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
21 See Diane Marie Amann, A Whipsaw Cuts Both Ways: The Privilege Against SelfIncrimination in an International Context, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1201, 1208–18 (1998) (discussing evolution of the “same-jurisdiction rule”).
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court is defensible not just because the rule has a source, but because
the source is authorized to compel compliance based on some principle of political theory justifying government action. (Many such theories are available; this Section’s argument does not hinge on picking
one.) There may not always be a best source. For example, a transaction affecting two states might justify the application of either state’s
law. But there are often worse sources; in the prior example, either of
the two affected states’ laws might apply, but not the broadly worded
laws of a third state with no connection to the dispute.22
In sum, courts often must choose between conflicting rules with
overlapping scopes emanating from distinct sources claiming authority to regulate a disputed issue. This goal should be uncontroversial.23
But two salient features of the Constitution make this goal difficult to
implement in practice.
2. Complications in the United States Federal System
The first problem stems from the separation of powers among
three branches of the federal government. Although nominally only
the legislative branch makes law, it is long-settled that both the executive and judicial branches possess authority to create binding rules,
both formally and informally. Some of this authority is delegated
from Congress, but some arguably arises from inherent power.24
Courts in a federal system thus routinely confront a critical question:
Which federal institutions are authoritative sources of law in particular contexts?
A second problem arises from federalism. The Constitution
designates different levels of government—the United States and the
22 See Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 815, 823 (1985) (holding that a
Kansas court could not apply forum law to claims by class members with “no apparent
connection to the State”).
23 Of course, the fact that a choice is necessary does not mean that judges will
agree about what constitutes an adequate justification for making that choice. Colorful disputes therefore can exist even within a mature legal system. See, e.g., Francis v.
Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 552 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s “ipse
dixit” as “baldly asserted . . . without the slightest veneer of reasoning to shield the
obvious fiat by which it has reached its result” and “a sad disservice to the Court’s
obligation to elaborate on its rationales”).
24 See infra subsection III.D.2 (discussing inherent judicial power). For a discussion of inherent executive power, compare STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S.
YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 20, 430 (2008) (endorsing inherent powers), with Louis
Fisher, The Unitary Executive and Inherent Executive Power, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 569,
586 (2010) (arguing that Calabresi and Yoo conflate inherent and implied powers
and that the idea of inherent powers lacks constitutional support).
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states individually25—as authoritative sources of law that often exercise overlapping authority. This arrangement inevitably leads to conflict among potentially applicable rules. Courts must then determine
which rule has priority by assessing the extent of each government’s
authority.
Choice of law analysis in the United States federal system thus
involves two concurrent choices. The court must decide which government is an authoritative source of law and which institution within
that government is authoritative. For example, when the federal government can create law, it does not necessarily follow that federal
courts can create federal common law.26 Likewise, when state governments are the appropriate source of law, there is a question about
which state institutions—such as higher courts or lower courts—are
authoritative expositors of that law.27
3. The Distinction Between Choosing Governments, Institutions,
and Rules
A final complexity arises from parsing the word “law” in the
phrase “choice of law.” Subsection 2 concluded that choice of law
analysis in a federal system requires choosing both an authoritative
government and an authoritative lawmaking institution. But choosing
an institution does not tell us what specific rules to apply in a case.
Identifying an applicable rule requires a further inquiry: we need to
know what rules the authoritative institution endorses. These may be
rules that the institution created, but they may also be rules from
another source to which the institution defers, or which the institution incorporates into its own law.28 For example, federal law can
require courts to apply rules enacted by state legislatures, a state’s law
can require its courts to apply rules from other states, and both state
and federal law might enforce a contract requiring courts to apply
foreign rules.
This analysis suggests that a choice of law inquiry in the United
States does not really involve choosing “law” so much as choosing
paths that lead to law. Courts choose which governments are authoritative sources of law, which institutions within those governments may
shape law, and which specific laws those institutions endorse.
25 States can in rare instances make law collectively, with congressional approval.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (authorizing interstate compacts).
26 See infra Section III.A.
27 See infra subsection III.D.2.
28 The distinction between “incorporating” and “deferring” to law can be fuzzy.
See supra notes 9–15 and accompanying text.
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An added wrinkle is that criteria for making each kind of choice
might emanate from different sources. For example, federal law
might provide criteria for choosing which state government is an
authoritative source of rules addressing a particular issue. But state
law might provide criteria for determining whether the chosen state
would apply its own rules or defer to rules from another state.29
B. Swift
The prior Section illustrates that even if the Erie opinion did not
exist, the problems that the Erie doctrine confronts would still be salient given rule of law ideals embedded in a federal system. Courts
would need some way to determine which governments are authoritative sources of law, which institutions in those governments are
authoritative, and which rules those institutions endorse. An early
effort to address these questions was Erie’s predecessor, Swift v.
Tyson.30
Analyzing Swift suggests that the much-criticized pre-Erie choice
of law regime was mostly consistent with the analytical framework discussed in Section A. Swift asked the right questions; the problem was
with the answers.
In Swift, the parties disputed the enforceability of a negotiable
instrument executed as part of a shady land transaction. The plaintiff
contended that he had acquired a bill of exchange from a third party
requiring the defendant to pay $1540.30.31 The defendant tried to
avoid paying by arguing that the third party had tricked him into providing the bill as payment for worthless land that the third party might
not even have owned.32 The defendant’s argument seemed weak
because under what is known as the holder in due course rule, an
indorsee can enforce a bill if he acquired it “without any notice of
facts which impeach its validity.”33 In effect, the bill is like cash, and
its origins are less important than its face value. However, some New
York courts had created an exception to the holder in due course rule
when the indorsee acquired an instrument as payment for a preexisting debt, as the plaintiff had done in Swift.34
The Supreme Court expressed “serious doubt” about whether
decisions creating an exception to the holder in due course rule
29 See infra subsection III.D.1.
30 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
31 Id. at 14.
32 See id. at 14–15.
33 Id. at 15.
34 See id. at 16–18.
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reflected the current thinking of New York’s highest court.35 Nevertheless, the Court assumed for the sake of argument that New York’s
courts had “fully settled” the exception in the defendant’s favor.36
The issue for the Supreme Court was whether these state decisions
were an authoritative source of law that bound federal courts.
Justice Story’s opinion framed the choice of law inquiry by distinguishing between two kinds of law: “general” and “local.”37 The Court
never developed a precise definition of “general law.” But the term
was understood to encompass rules that were not created by particular
sovereigns and yet had by informal custom or express consensus
become legitimate sources of authority on which courts could rely.38
In contrast, local law encompassed “the positive statutes of the state,
and the construction thereof adopted by the local tribunals, and . . .
rights and titles to things having a permanent locality, such as the
rights and titles to real estate, and other matters immovable and intraterritorial in their nature and character.”39 The general/local distinction collapsed over time as the Court expanded the concept of general law to include subjects of intense local interest, such as tort law
and the validity of municipal bonds.40 But judges at the time of Swift
would have understood the fuzzy distinction reasonably well.41
The general/local distinction mattered because the Court
believed that state court decisions were binding on matters of local
law,42 but merely persuasive on matters of general law.43 On this view,
state courts had no special claim to authority when applying general
35 Id. at 17.
36 Id. at 18.
37 Id. at 8.
38 See William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1517 (1984).
“General” law was derived from “jus gentium, or the law of nations,” and “operated as a
set of background rules that courts applied in the absence of any binding sovereign
command to the contrary.” Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1279–80 (1996).
39 Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18.
40 See FREYER, supra note 16, at 57–71; Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark,
General Law in Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 655, 693–701 (2013).
41 See FREYER, supra note 16, at 52.
42 A subsequent opinion elaborated that “no principle” allowed the Court to
ignore state court decisions addressing matters of local law “when the land disposed
of was within their borders, and the parties in interest were citizens belonging to their
community.” Beauregard v. City of New Orleans, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 497, 503 (1856).
43 Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 19 (“[T]he decisions of the local tribunals upon such
subjects [of general law] are entitled to, and will receive, the most deliberate attention and respect of this Court; but they cannot furnish positive rules, or conclusive
authority, by which our own judgments are to be bound up and governed.”).
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law rooted in transjurisdictional customs and refined over generations
by multiple tribunals. State decisions constituted only new data points
in an already large set. The Supreme Court perceived itself as free to
analyze the data for itself and reach its own conclusions about the
meaning of general law.
The Court interpreted New York’s decisions refining the holder
in due course rule as relying on general law rather than creating local
law.44 This interpretation meant that the decisions were not binding.
Freed from the obligation of respecting New York precedent, the
Court announced its “own opinion of the true result of the commercial law” that required enforcing the plaintiff’s bill.45
Swift asked the right questions, albeit without phrasing those
questions in a way that a modern reader would expect. First, Swift
asked which government was the appropriate source of law. The
Court concluded that the answer was none because the law emanated
from customary practice rather than sovereign authority. It was “not
the law of a single country only, but of the commercial world.”46
Next, Swift considered which institutions were the appropriate expositors of applicable law. The opinion concluded that the Court itself
could deduce the relevant rules from the general law using “general
reasoning and legal analogies.”47
Throughout its analysis the Court recognized that it was not free
to ignore authoritative sources of law—it conceded that it must apply
local law—but believed that it was in fact applying law from an authoritative source. The opinion thus pays at least some attention to choice
of law methodology, which is not surprising given that Justice Story
had previously written a 532-page treatise on the subject.48
Swift could have asked more precise questions, but the real problem was with the answers. For example, it was debatable whether the
44 See id. at 18 (“[T]he Courts of New York do not found their decisions upon this
point upon any local statute, or positive, fixed, or ancient local usage: but they deduce
the doctrine from the general principles of commercial law.”).
45 Id. at 19.
46 Id. Justice Story may have overestimated commercial law’s transnational uniformity. See Emily Kadens, The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant, 90 TEX. L. REV.
1153, 1160 (2012) (noting that “most of the areas of commerce long thought to compose a broadly shared law merchant evolved from contract or legislation rather than
custom” and “gap-filling [customs] . . . were usually not uniform and universal but
rather local and contested”).
47 Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 19 (noting that state and federal courts applying
general law were engaged in “like functions” using the same methods).
48 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1st ed. 1834). For a
discussion of how federal courts applied Swift’s choice of law approach in subsequent
cases, see FREYER, supra note 16, at 45–100.
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New York decisions really were examples of general rather than local
law, whether a federal court could ignore state court interpretations
even of general law, and whether the distinction between general and
local law made any sense. Additional language in the opinion—such
as the assertion that judicial opinions are “only evidence of what the
laws are; and are not of themselves laws”49—was also questionable.50
The weaknesses underlying Swift’s reasoning gradually attracted
normative and practical criticism.51 Doubts mounted as federal courts
expanded the scope of general law to displace state regulation of traditionally local matters.52 This skepticism culminated in Erie’s broad
repudiation of Swift.
C. Erie
The plaintiff in Erie sought to recover damages for injuries caused
by a passing train while he was walking along the defendant railroad’s
right of way. The parties disputed two issues: (1) whether federal
courts should determine the railroad’s duty of care under “general
law” or the “common law of Pennsylvania”; and (2) the content of
Pennsylvania’s common law.53 The Court resolved the first issue by
concluding that general law was not binding and avoided the second
issue by remanding to the circuit court.54 On remand, the Second
Circuit held that Pennsylvania law did not require the railroad to protect the plaintiff because he was a “wayfarer” upon a “longitudinal”
path rather than a “crossing” path.55 In contrast, if general law had
applied, the railroad would have owed a duty of care no matter which
49 Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18.
50 See Harold M. Bowman, The Unconstitutionality of the Rule of Swift v. Tyson, 18
B.U. L. REV. 659, 662 n.9 (1938) (summarizing the origins of and early reactions to
Swift’s distinction between law and evidence of law).
51 For a synthesis of critiques, see PURCELL, supra note 16, at 66–69. Some of the
criticism was leveled at Swift’s author. Justice Frankfurter, while still a law professor at
Harvard, relayed another Harvard professor’s view that Swift stemmed from the “restless vanity” of Justice Story, who was allegedly “fond of glittering generalities” and had
a “reputation for learning greater even than the learning itself.” Felix Frankfurter,
Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499,
529–30 n.151 (1928) (quoting JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE
LAW 253 (2d ed. 1921)). Ironically, Justice Frankfurter was later subject to similarly
personal criticism of his own allegedly “egregious misinterpretation” of Erie stemming
from “personal motives” and “resentment of Brandeis.” PURCELL, supra note 16, at
206, 212.
52 See supra note 40.
53 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938).
54 See id.
55 Tompkins v. Erie R.R. Co., 98 F.2d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 1938).
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direction the plaintiff was walking.56 Identifying the source of law governing the plaintiff’s claim was therefore not an academic exercise; it
determined who won and who lost.
Erie reached its conclusion that general law did not apply by
acknowledging the basic propositions discussed in Section A, albeit in
a scattered fashion that has led to confusion. I have highlighted the
parallels to Section A by reordering and summarizing three salient
points in Justice Brandeis’s majority opinion.
First, the opinion stated that “law . . . does not exist without some
definite authority behind it.”57 This confirms the observation in Section A that the rule of law ideal requires not only identifying a source
of law, but also determining whether that source is authoritative with
respect to a disputed issue. Swift had deemed general law to be
authoritative, while Erie did not.
Second, the opinion concluded that the “last word” on the content of a legal rule should come from institutions with authority to
create or interpret that rule.58 When considering state law, the relevant institutions were the state’s “Legislature or its Supreme Court.”59
This conclusion confirms Section A’s observation that selecting law
from an authoritative government is insufficient. Instead, courts must
further determine which government institutions are authorized to
shape the content of binding rules. The Court applied a similar
insight to the federal government when it concluded that “the federal
courts” lack a general lawmaking power.60 Thus, the fact that one
institution of the federal government (such as Congress) could potentially enact a rule does not mean that the federal courts could promulgate the same rule.
Finally, the opinion held that “[e]xcept in matters governed by
the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied
56 See Erie, 304 U.S. at 70 (noting that the plaintiff had prevailed in the lower
courts).
57 Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
58 Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 535 (Holmes, J., dissenting)). The Court also stated that efforts to identify a rule’s source should not rely on
drawing lines that are unsatisfactory. Id. at 74. However, this objection to Swift did
not appear to challenge general law’s legitimacy. The Court doubted whether the
line between “general” and “local” law was a coherent basis for selecting a source of
law, but this part of the opinion grounds that concern only in empirical observations
that the line created frustrating “uncertainties” about which law regulated behavior.
Id. at 74–75.
59 Id. at 79.
60 Id.
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in any case is the law of the state.”61 This holding confirmed that in a
federal system the federal government is not always an appropriate
source of binding rules. Given Erie’s conclusion that federal and general law were both unavailable, the only remaining option on the facts
of Erie was state law.62
Isolating and rearranging Erie’s components reveals that both Erie
and Swift asked similar questions; the revolutionary aspect of Erie
came in the answers. The answer to the “which government” question
in diversity cases involving common law and customary practices was
no longer none, but rather the states. The answer to the “which institution” question when federal law is inapplicable was no longer the
federal courts, but rather the state courts. Neither answer hinges on
any distinction between “local” and “general” law.
Although Erie was interesting and important, it was too easy a case
to establish parameters for the doctrine bearing its name. Analyzing
choice of law in federal court is difficult only when there is a plausible
conflict for the court to resolve. The potential existence of conflict
requires considering the scope of competing rules and the relative
authority of competing rulemakers. These vexing questions are at the
heart of modern cases attempting to apply Erie.63 But in Erie itself, the
Court quickly rejected the idea that any law other than Pennsylvania
common law could be relevant. That conclusion was correct once the
Court abandoned Swift’s distinction between general and local law.
The holding therefore provided little guidance for cases where federal law might be relevant or where multiple states purported to regulate the same conduct. What we now call the Erie doctrine required
further elaboration.
D. An Illustration of Erie in Operation: Standard Oil
The Court has confronted dozens of cases in Erie’s wake that
directly presented difficult questions about creation, interpretation,
and prioritization of federal law, and adoption of non-federal law.
Erie had skirted these questions by rejecting general law. The Court’s
1947 decision in United States v. Standard Oil Co.64 is especially interesting because it implicates each of Erie’s four components. The opinion
provides a concrete illustration of the abstract rule of law principles
61 Id. at 78.
62 The opinion also addressed other issues, such as risks of “discrimination” and
forum shopping in a federal system, id. at 76, that might help flesh out how Erie
applies in practice, as I discuss in Part III.
63 See infra Part III.
64 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
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discussed in Section A and the need for precision in parsing choice of
law problems.
Standard Oil involved a tort suit in federal court by the United
States against the owner of a truck that had injured a United States
soldier. The United States sought reimbursement for the soldier’s
medical care and salary while he could not perform his duties, as well
as damages for loss of the soldier’s services.65
A threshold question was whether state or federal law governed
liability in the absence of a controlling federal statute. The Court concluded that “federal common law”66 applied because “the scope,
nature, legal incidents and consequences of the relation between persons in service and the Government are fundamentally derived from
federal sources and governed by federal authority.”67 On the merits,
the Court rejected the government’s theory of liability, in part
because it felt that Congress should play the leading role in creating
new rights to sue.68 Federal common law thus did not create a new
tort theory; instead, it preempted potentially relevant state rules.
More importantly for my purposes here, the Court felt the need
to distinguish Erie despite the fact that neither party relied on general
law. The Court observed that Erie’s “object and effect were . . . to
bring federal judicial power under subjection to state authority in matters essentially of local interest and state control.”69 In contrast, Erie
“had no effect” on the judiciary’s authority to craft rules governing
“essentially federal matters, even though Congress has not acted
affirmatively.”70 The Court thus treated Erie as confirming the need
for law to derive from authoritative sources, drawing a line between
areas where federal law was authoritative and where it was not, and
assuming that the federal courts were an institution that was authorized to create law in appropriate circumstances.71
Dicta in Standard Oil went on to consider Erie’s interpretation and
prioritization prongs, albeit without framing the analysis in those
terms. The Court observed that whether federal law preempts state
65 Id. at 302.
66 Id. at 308.
67 Id. at 305–06.
68 Id. at 316.
69 Id. at 307.
70 Id.
71 The Court muddied its analysis by opining that “[w]hether or not . . . state law
is to control in such a case as this is not at all a matter to be decided by application of
the Erie rule.” Id. at 309. A more accurate statement would have been that Erie’s
holding favoring state law was not dispositive, but the “Erie rule” and underlying principles were relevant.
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law is a context-sensitive question that requires interpreting the federal law that ostensibly applies.72 Scrutiny might reveal that federal
law is not as broad as it appears to be. For example, when Congress
enacts a statute that “partially” addresses federal interests while
“fail[ing] to make other provision[s]” addressing subjects on which
state law “ordinarily” governs, then courts can assume that Congress
“consented” to resolving those subjects under state law.73 The Court
did not explain whether state law would apply as an alternative to federal law or whether federal common law would incorporate state law
to fill gaps in the statute. However, the two cases that the Court cited
to support its analysis both suggest that state law would apply because
federal law could not apply.74 Standard Oil therefore confirmed that
federal law displaces state law only on matters within the federal law’s
scope and that interpretation is necessary to reveal that scope.
The Court also made a tentative effort to identify factors influencing whether a nationally uniform federal law would apply when its
scope encompassed an issue but did not clearly require displacing
state law. For example, state law might apply when it “affords a convenient and fair mode of disposition,” provides a predicate to federal
action (such as voiding a title to land that the United States subsequently purchased), is consistent with a perceived need for national
uniformity, or otherwise accords with “specific governmental interests.”75 Here again, the Court was not clear about which component
of Erie it was applying. The Court could have been discussing the priority of federal law or the incorporation of state law. The distinction
determines whether state law would apply as federal common law or
as an alternative to federal law.76 Nevertheless, the Court recognized
72 An earlier decision made the point more directly, noting while discussing Erie
that the extent to which a federal statute preempts state law “though left by the statute
to judicial determination” is “nevertheless to be derived from it and the federal policy
which it has adopted.” Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 200–01 (1940).
73 Standard Oil, 332 U.S. at 309.
74 See id. at 309 n.13; Blair v. Comm’r, 300 U.S. 5, 9–11 (1937) (deferring to state
court’s “final” authority on “local law” as predicate to resolving “federal question”);
Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver Cnty., 328 U.S. 204, 210 (1946) (holding that a
federal statute did not displace “established local tax assessment and collection
machinery”).
75 Standard Oil, 332 U.S. at 309–10.
76 The Court subsequently cited Standard Oil in the course of holding that federal
common law sometimes “adopt[s]” state law, but did not expressly indicate that Standard Oil had discussed this possibility (as opposed to discussing the application of state
law as an alternative to federal law). United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S.
715, 728 (1979). However, there is no indication in Standard Oil that the Court
believed that state law could displace a valid federal statute on issues within the fed-
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the importance of choosing between federal and state law and articulated factors influencing that choice.
The Court’s imprecision in distinguishing creation, interpretation, prioritization, and adoption helps to explain why commentators
have criticized the holding. The odd result of Standard Oil is that it
preempts state remedies by federalizing tort law governing the relationship between the United States and its soldiers, but does not substitute a new rule to occupy the field it cleared. The Court
simultaneously asserted that congressional authorization was not necessary to displace state law but was necessary to replace state law. Commentators question whether this concurrent denial of federal
remedies and exclusion of state remedies is sensible given Congress’s
limited capacity to create new law reacting to the Court’s decisions.77
If Congress will not replant fields that the Court clears, then perhaps
the Court should merely prune the field to preserve at least a basic
level of regulation.
A more precise account of Erie might have altered Standard Oil’s
holding to mitigate this criticism. Separating the creation, interpretation, priority, and adoption issues forces courts to focus on the content of the rules they create. Here, the Court created a preemptive
rule, yet acted as if it had not created any rule and had instead
deferred to Congress. An explicit focus on the creation inquiry would
have highlighted the Court’s role as an institutional source of governing law (in the form of dormant preemption). Likewise, explicit
focus on the interpretation inquiry might have highlighted the broad
preemptive scope of the Court’s rule. The Court also prioritized federal law over state law without considering the content of potentially
conflicting state rules, which is an essential component of the prioritization and adoption inquiries and could have resulted in allowing at
least some state rules to survive.78 Of course, the Court might have
eral statute’s scope. The opinion is thus best read as addressing Erie’s adoption
inquiry rather than its prioritization inquiry.
77 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 632 (6th ed. 2009).
78 See infra subsection III.D.1 (discussing the adoption inquiry). For example,
when a court conducting a prioritization inquiry carefully considers the content of
both federal and state law, it might apply state law because either: (1) state law
encompasses matters that are beyond the scope of federal law, and thus is not preempted; or (2) the conflict between state and federal law requires rethinking the
scope of federal law, such that the interpretation inquiry becomes a safety valve to
avoid a prioritization holding. See infra subsection III.B.1; see also Allan Erbsen, Erie’s
Starting Points: The Potential Role of Default Rules in Structuring Choice of Law Analysis, 10
J.L. ECON. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2013) (analyzing how default rules might skew the
interpretation inquiry toward embracing or avoiding conflict with state law).
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reached the same conclusions even if it had been more precise
because it was uncomfortable allowing state law to have any role in
regulating the relationship between the United States and its soldiers.
But a more precise Erie analysis may have inspired a more limited
holding that preserved a role for state law (at least when the United
States was the plaintiff)79 absent congressional preemption or a specific threat to federal interests.
E. Synthesis of Erie’s Central Functions
Considering the principles discussed in Section A and the cases
discussed in Sections B through D highlights how the Erie doctrine
has four components that answer three questions.
First, Erie enforces limits on the authority of governments and
institutions that create federal law. A judge crafting a rule of federal
common law must consider Erie’s admonition about the limited scope
of judicial power.80 Likewise, a member of Congress reviewing a bill
must consider Erie’s concerns about the limited scope of federal
power.81
Second, Erie requires interpreting federal law to determine its
scope. Some federal rules apply broadly to many people, places, and
contexts, while others apply narrowly. A rule’s scope will influence
whether it conflicts with state law.
Third, Erie prioritizes conflicting federal and state laws. When
parties to litigation in federal court seek a binding resolution of their
dispute, multiple sources of law might provide potentially relevant
rules. Erie and its progeny help judges choose which rules to apply.
79 If state law creates claims or rejects defenses in suits against the United States,
then the United States would need to account for fifty sets of rules when trying to
avoid liability and protect the federal treasury. When state law controls the rights of
the United States as a plaintiff, there is less need for complex planning and no risk
that the treasury will be further depleted (beyond the uncompensated loss that the
United States seeks to recover). Nevertheless, relying on state law could still be troubling even when the United States is a plaintiff if states fail to respect federal interests
by, for example, misconstruing the principal/agent relationship between the United
States and its soldiers or recognizing spurious defenses to federal claims.
80 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (noting limited “power”
of the “federal courts”).
81 Although Erie is generally treated as a case governing judicial power, it also
opines on legislative power. See id. (“Congress has no power to declare substantive
rules of common law applicable in a State.”). For a discussion of whether and how
legislators must consider constitutional limits on their authority, see Neal Kumar
Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1335 (2001).
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Finally, Erie fills the void left by an absence of federal law in federal court by adopting non-federal rules.82 This inquiry requires
determining which non-federal sources of law are authoritative, which
institutions authoritatively determine the content of that law, and
whether a particular government relies on rules that it did not create
(such as by deferring to the laws of other states, or to general law).
These four components collectively help federal courts make
three important choices: between governments, between institutions
within governments, and about the content of rules that the selected
institution created or endorsed.
Erie’s four functions overlap, such that my taxonomy describes
useful analytical categories rather than formally distinct concepts.
When the categories collide, the ensuing doctrinal mess is easier to
resolve if courts and commentators can track each strand of an intertwined inquiry. Two overlaps are especially salient—between creation
and interpretation and between interpretation and prioritization—
raising problems that I address in Part III.
The boundary between creation and interpretation of law is indeterminate. For example, a court interpreting a statute often adds and
subtracts, stretching some terms and compressing others. The resulting rule is a hybrid of the legislature’s text and the judiciary’s gloss.
When the text is silent, courts fill the gaps. At some point this gapfilling moves so far beyond what the statute encompasses that interstitial “interpretation” really creates a new common law rule.83 Even a
seemingly clear rule can transform in the process of judicial efforts to
interpret its relevance to a specific case.
Erie itself repudiated distinctions between law and judicial opinions applying law, recognizing that the opinion helps to frame rules
governing the outcome. As Justice Frankfurter subsequently
explained, Erie “overruled a particular way of looking at law . . . as a
‘brooding omnipresence’ of Reason, of which decisions were merely
evidence and not themselves the controlling formulations.”84 Some
legal realists go further and reject any difference between creating
and applying rules—the act of applying a rule creates a new case-spe82 For a discussion of the potentially nuanced distinction between adopting and
incorporating law, see supra notes 9–15 and accompanying text.
83 See, e.g., FALLON ET AL., supra note 77, at 607 (“As specific evidence of legislative purpose with respect to the issue at hand attenuates, all interpretation shades into
judicial lawmaking.”); Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the
Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 332 (1980) (“The difference between ‘common law’ and ‘statutory interpretation’ . . . is entirely one of degree.”).
84 Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101–02 (1945).
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cific rule—but theorists generally acknowledge that rules have some
content independent of their application in litigation.85
Accordingly, there is a difference between a court making law in
the sense of determining a dispute’s outcome by applying a rule and
making law in the sense of creating the rule being applied. This distinction between adjudication and lawmaking can be helpful when
contemplating Erie’s doctrinal nuances, especially when courts
attempt to identify the content of federal and state rules.86 The
boundary between creation and interpretation is thus fuzzy to draw,
but still useful to consider.
Interpretation and prioritization share a similarly imprecise
boundary. The priority inquiry requires considering whether to apply
a federal or state rule when the two conflict. Yet whether they conflict
is a matter of interpretation; the federal rule could be read broadly or
narrowly to create or avoid a conflict. For example, a canon of interpretation favoring a broad reading of federal rules governing litigation in federal courts would be a covert priority rule that incorporates
the goal of displacing state law. Likewise, a canon limiting the scope
of federal law to avoid conflicts with state law would be a covert priority rule respecting state interests. Rules governing interpretation and
priority can therefore incorporate aspects of both inquiries.87
The fact that Erie encompasses four distinct yet partially overlapping components addressing three distinct questions helps explain
why Erie is confusing. In many contexts, either most of the doctrine is
irrelevant or a particular component is especially salient. Yet decisions implementing Erie often do not carefully parse between its components. This imprecision gives Erie jurisprudence an ethereal aura.
The “Erie doctrine” seems to permeate federal law even as its many
manifestations appear dissimilar. Attempts to illuminate Erie create a
fleeting sense of accomplishment as insights that seem profound in
one context prove tangential in others.
Fragmenting Erie into its components can clarify doctrine and
suggest avenues for reform. Analyzing each component in isolation
85 See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE 96 (2010)
(contending that legal realists sought to attack “the notion that judging merely
entailed the logical application of legal rules and principles,” but did not go so far as
to contend “that legal rules and principles do not have a significant role in judges’
decisions”)
86 See infra Part III.
87 See infra subsection III.B.1. Canons of interpretation routinely have substantive
consequences or aspirations that can complicate efforts to distinguish the act of interpretation from broader policy preferences. See Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons
and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 121–25, 168–77 (2010).
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highlights how each applies in different contexts, implicates different
values, and raises different challenges. Efforts to discuss Erie as an
amorphous whole are thus likely to be more frustrating and less fruitful than a more focused discussion of creation, interpretation, prioritization, or adoption. The remainder of the Article builds on this
observation.
II. ERIE’S ASSUMPTIONS: A THRESHOLD INQUIRY
DOCTRINE’S UNDERLYING VALUES

INTO THE

Recognizing that Erie has four components reveals the doctrine’s
functions, but does not reveal how the doctrine operates in practice.
Analyzing how Erie operates requires asking a threshold question that
courts and commentators often overlook when wrestling with doctrine: What values does Erie promote? If we do not know the premises
that guide Erie analysis, we cannot know how the Erie doctrine should
apply in a particular case.
This Part contains more questions than answers. The goal is not
to identify a specific set of principles animating the Erie doctrine, but
rather to consider their source and importance in implementing each
of Erie’s four functions. Further scholarship can then develop these
principles, which in turn can help resolve the doctrinal puzzles that I
analyze in Part III.
Even if courts know the functions that Erie serves, they need to
identify values that inform the implementation of those functions in
order to know how Erie applies in particular circumstances. For example, suppose that in a diversity case the plaintiff contends that the federal court should apply state common law rule S and the defendant
responds that the court should apply federal statutory rule F. How
should the court choose between S and F if the issue could plausibly
fall within the scope of both rules? As with all legal decisions, the
court needs criteria to structure its analysis. Those criteria will vary
depending on which goals the choice should promote.
First, suppose that Erie’s sole goal in the prioritization context is
to enforce the Constitution’s separation of powers. This goal would
require courts to focus on whether an ostensibly applicable federal law
emerged from an institution with authority to regulate the disputed
issue. If authority is the only factor, then rule F will apply if Article I
authorized Congress to enact it. Erie’s prioritization inquiry would
thus add essentially nothing to the creation and interpretation inquiries. Federal priority would follow automatically from a conclusion
that an issue falls within the scope of a properly created federal law.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-2\NDL203.txt

606

unknown

Seq: 28

notre dame law review

19-FEB-14

12:43

[vol. 89:2

Second, suppose instead that Erie’s prioritization goal is solely to
protect state interests in a federal system. In this regime, rule S might
apply even if rule F is valid. The validity of the federal rule would not
be dispositive if there is a plausible state interest, especially given that
federal jurisdiction might exist solely due to a quirk of the parties’
citizenship rather than the existence of a federal claim. Even if the
Supremacy Clause creates a priority rule favoring the federal statute,
federalism concerns might inspire an interpretative canon that cabins
the statute’s scope to avoid triggering the priority rule. Resting Erie
on federalism grounds thus might shift judicial focus from Erie’s prioritization inquiry to its interpretation inquiry.
Finally, suppose that separation of powers and federalism are not
the only relevant concerns. Choosing between F and S might then
require asking additional questions. For example: Is rule S integral to
the state’s broader regulatory regime? Is rule F central to the federal
court’s administration of its docket? Is either rule better than the
other (e.g., more just, more efficient, etc.)? Or would applying one of
the rules lead to unfair surprise? The court cannot know what questions to ask until it knows what values inform its inquiry. The court
must also know what its inquiry is supposed to accomplish. Is the
court asking whether F is a valid exercise of the rulemaker’s authority,
whether F encompasses the disputed issue, or whether F has priority
over inconsistent state rules? The choice between F and S thus
requires analysis that is more granular than a general reference to
“Erie” might suggest.
Specifying values that the Erie doctrine seeks to protect is also
important in the creation context. For example, consider Standard
Oil,88 which created federal common law governing the relationship
between the United States and its soldiers. If the concerns animating
Erie’s limits on the creation of federal common law focus on federalism, then Standard Oil’s creation of federal common law makes sense.
Strong federal interests justify federal law governing torts against
soldiers on active duty. Yet if separation of powers concerns animate
Erie’s limits on the creation of federal common law, then Standard Oil
is harder to justify. The Constitution gives Congress power to “support Armies”89 and the President power to command them,90 but does
not expressly grant the judiciary power to assist in these endeavors by
inventing or displacing tort rules.
88 See supra Section I.D.
89 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
90 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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There is a sensible response to the separation of powers objection
to judicial lawmaking in Standard Oil, but that response does not avoid
the need to identify values underlying Erie. The judiciary arguably is
an appropriate source of law because Article I implicitly preempts
state tort law governing soldiers, and thus the judiciary must create
common law filling the regulatory void until Congress acts. However,
this response merely shifts the Erie inquiry from the creation context
to the interpretation context. The response indicates that federal
courts may create common law to fill regulatory voids, but now courts
need to know which constitutional provisions create such voids.
Identifying voids that might justify federal common law requires
interpreting the Constitution to determine its preemptive scope,
which varies from clause to clause. For example, the Raise and Support Clause animating Standard Oil apparently preempts more state
law than the Inferior Courts Clause authorizing Congress to regulate
lower federal courts. The Inferior Courts Clause enables Congress to
regulate federal procedure, and courts can in turn fill regulatory voids
with procedural common law.91 Yet current doctrine presumes that
this federal common law is not automatically preemptive when it conflicts with state law.92 Current doctrine governing the Inferior Courts
Clause thus tolerates less robust dormant preemption than Standard
Oil’s interpretation of the Raise and Support Clause. Accordingly,
Erie’s interpretation component determines whether the Constitution
generates regulatory voids that authorize federal common law and
influences the preemptive force of that void-filling law in the subsequent prioritization inquiry. Erie’s interpretative preferences about
common law creation are therefore critically important, yet courts
cannot define these preferences without insight into Erie’s underlying
values.
If this discussion of federal common law seems to roam far afield
from the actual Erie decision, recall that Erie was a diversity case. The
Erie court therefore could have attempted to rehabilitate and modernize Swift by reasoning along the following lines: In diversity cases, the
Diversity Clause authorizes federal courts to create federal common
law that governs disputed issues; sometimes this federal common law
mirrors state law, but sometimes it borrows from other sources, such
as general law. Erie obviously did not venture in this direction. But
rejecting this potential interpretation of the Diversity Clause while
endorsing Standard Oil’s interpretation of the Raise and Support
Clause requires criteria for distinguishing the two contexts. Doctrine
91
92

See infra notes 157–58 and accompanying text.
See infra subsection III.C.2.
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governing when federal courts can create federal common law and
how federal courts should interpret the Constitution’s preemptive
scope is thus entangled with doctrine addressing how federal courts
should decide when to adopt nonfederal law. Parsing the distinct
inquiries and identifying values and criteria relevant to each can lead
to a clearer understanding of how “Erie” applies in particular cases.
Framing Erie analysis as dependent on Erie’s core concerns highlights a problem that has confounded courts and commentators for
seventy-five years. The problem becomes clear by distinguishing the
role that Erie plays in a federal system from how Erie performs that
role. The role is important for the reasons noted in Part I: courts in
the United States federal system must ensure that the content of legal
rules emanate from an authoritative source. Yet even Swift acknowledged that choice of law is not simply the exercise of naked preferences. The Swift approach to choice of law had its own set of
priorities and techniques for selecting and interpreting rules that in
hindsight were flawed, but at the time would have appeared rational.93
Recognizing that Erie and Swift both played the same role of constraining judicial choices in a federal system underscores that the role
can be performed in distinct ways. Some might be better than others,
but that ranking is not self-evident. More importantly, a clear justification for ranking competing methods does not emerge from Justice
Brandeis’s notoriously opaque opinion in Erie, which overrules Swift
without fully defining an alternative regime.
Erie’s imprecision means that courts attempting to develop and
apply the Erie doctrine confront an early obstacle. Courts know in the
abstract what they are trying to accomplish (constrain their discretion
when creating, interpreting, prioritizing, or adopting rules), and they
know that articulating those constraints requires identifying a set of
values to animate specific choice of law inquiries, but they do not
know precisely what those values are. In particular, courts confront at
least two vexing puzzles that I address below in Sections A and B.
Courts must first determine the extent to which Erie has a foundation
in positive law and then must identify the non-positive sources that fill
gaps in the positive foundations.
A. The Puzzle of Positive Constraint:
The Constitution and the Rules of Decision Act
One way to demystify Erie is to contend that the abstract doctrine
has a foundation in a specific authoritative text. Implementation of
93

See supra Section I.B.
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Erie would then become an exercise in interpretation to tease out the
relevant concerns. That exercise would still be difficult, but at least it
would be grounded in a familiar context and performed using familiar analytical tools.
The problem is that several texts might be relevant and their
meaning is disputed. So the twin puzzles are to first find and then
interpret a relevant text (if any exists) in a way that can guide subsequent steps in the Erie framework.
An often mentioned possibility is that the Constitution may animate Erie. Indeed, Justice Brandeis expressly invoked the Constitution to defend Erie’s holding. This reference might have been helpful
if it had been developed. But the opinion cites only “the Constitution” as a whole without citing specific provisions.94 Erie’s citation to
the Constitution was not only imprecise, but also gratuitous because,
as the concurrence observed, “[n]o constitutional question was suggested or argued below or here.”95
Erie’s enigmatic references to “the Constitution” eerily replicate
methods that the opinion elsewhere criticizes. Swift’s allusion to an
amorphous general law yields to an allusion to an amorphous constitutional law. The flexibility that courts enjoy when implementing the
imprecise constitutional command invites a critique that Erie itself leveled against Swift: rules derived from indeterminate sources may rest
on “little less than what the judge advancing the doctrine thinks at the
time” is the right result.96
Courts and commentators have reacted to Justice Brandeis’s brevity by suggesting numerous constitutional hooks on which to hang
94 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938). None of Erie’s four citations
to the Constitution invoke a specific clause. See id. at 78 (“[N]o clause in the Constitution purports to confer . . . upon the federal courts” a “power to declare substantive
rules of common law applicable in a State”); id. (“[T]he Constitution of the United
States . . . recognizes and preserves the autonomy and independence of the States.”);
id. at 79 (“Supervision over either the legislative or the judicial action of the States is
in no case permissible except as to matters by the Constitution specifically authorized
or delegated to the United States.”); id. at 80 (“We merely declare that in applying the
doctrine [of Swift v. Tyson] this Court and the lower courts have invaded rights which
in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the several States.”).
95 Id. at 82 (Butler, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Edward A. Purcell, Jr.,
The Story of Erie, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 21, 48–49 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d
ed. 2008) (noting that the railroad sought to preserve Swift’s central holding while
tweaking the definition of general law to exclude well-settled common law governing
access to rights of way).
96 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (quoting Balt. & Oh. R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401
(1893) (Field, J., dissenting)).
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Erie’s hat. Options include the Tenth Amendment,97 the Equal Protection Clause,98 the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,99 the
Supremacy Clause,100 Article III’s definition of “judicial Power,”101
97 U.S. CONST. amend. X; see, e.g., George D. Brown, Of Activism and Erie—The
Implication Doctrine’s Implications for the Nature and Role of the Federal Courts, 69 IOWA L.
REV. 617, 620 (1984) (“The rule of Swift was unconstitutional because it thrust the
national government into an area not assigned to it—the making of general law. . . .
The tenth amendment confirms this understanding, and Brandeis reaffirmed it . . . .”
(footnotes omitted)); cf. John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV.
693, 701–06 (1974) (“The question, here as with respect to any other question of
federal power, was whether anything in the Constitution provided a basis for the
authority being exerted—and the answer was no . . . . That point having been made
. . . the Constitution’s utility as a point of reference was ended.”).
98 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Compare Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy?
Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE L.J. 929, 998–99 (1996) (noting that Erie may
rely in part on “an equal protection consideration” barring Congress from allowing
“the citizenship of the disputants” to alter the applicable law, which would produce
“arbitrarily discriminatory results”), with Bradford R. Clark, Erie’s Constitutional Source,
95 CAL. L. REV. 1289, 1299 (2007) (“This [equal protection] reading . . . is both inconsistent with the structure of the Court’s opinion and anachronistic.”).
99 U.S. CONST. amend. V. Compare Kermit Roosevelt III, Valid Rule Due Process
Challenges: Bond v. United States and Erie’s Constitutional Source, 54 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 987, 999–1000 (2013) (“Erie’s constitutional source . . . is the Due Process
Clause,” which prohibits “deprivation of property” based on “law without a lawmaker,
which is to say no law at all.”), with Craig Green, Can Erie Survive as Federal Common
Law?, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 813, 833 (2013) (“Any due process ‘problem’ in [the
Swift] context would require a form of constitutional rights that is absent from familiar precedents and that lacks roots in the historical traditions and notions of popular
justice that dominate modern constitutional jurisprudence.”).
100 U.S. CONST. art VI. Compare Clark, supra note 98, at 1290 (“[T]he constitutional structure strongly suggests that the Supremacy Clause establishes the exclusive
basis for disregarding state law, and that more expansive judicial doctrines like Swift
are unconstitutional.”), with Craig Green, Erie and Problems of Constitutional Structure,
96 CAL. L. REV. 661, 665 (2008) (“[T]he Supremacy Clause has nothing to do with
‘federal general common law’ because the latter never claimed preemptive
‘supremacy’ and never bound state courts.”).
101 U.S. CONST. art III, § 1. Compare Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine?
(And What Does It Mean for the Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 245, 320 n.412 (2008) (proposing Article III as a “textually plausible,
structurally coherent constitutional basis” for Erie that might supplement the Tenth
Amendment), with Lawrence Earl Broh-Kahn, Amendment by Decision—More on the Erie
Case, 30 KY. L.J. 3, 56–57 (1941) (canvassing Founding-era sources to conclude that
Article III authorizes federal courts to resolve diversity cases without reference to state
law), and Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 91 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring in
part) (“I am not at all sure whether, in the absence of federal statutory direction,
federal courts would be compelled to follow state decisions.”). For further discussion
of whether Article III authorizes federal courts to develop common law governing
diversity cases, see Erbsen, supra note 78, and infra note 252–53 and accompanying
text.
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Article I’s definition of “legislative Powers,”102 and the general structure of the Constitution’s framework for federalism, separation of
powers, or both.103 Each of these potential constitutional sources
serves different purposes that would shape choice of law and federal
common law in different ways. Selecting one, some, all, or none is
therefore an essential first step in identifying values animating the Erie
doctrine. Judicial opinions that purport to apply Erie without identifying its constitutional—or extra-constitutional—foundation are destined to be unsatisfying.
Another potential positive constraint on choice of law in federal
court is the Rules of Decision Act (RDA), which provides that: “The
laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of
the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide,
shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of
the United States, in cases where they apply.”104 On this view, choice
of law in federal court is a function of legislative command.
Unfortunately, the RDA’s legislative command is neither clear
nor comprehensive, for at least four reasons. First, nobody knows
exactly what constitutes a “rule of decision.” If some rules are rules
“of decision,” then presumably another category of rules exists that
are “not of decision.” Multiple interpreters have struggled to identify

102 U.S. CONST. art I, § 1. Although Article I does not directly address the judiciary’s lawmaking authority, some theories of Erie link the scope of federal judicial
power to the scope of federal legislative power. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of
Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 395 (1964) (finding it
“unreasonable to suppose that the federal courts have a law-making power which the
federal legislature does not”); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 208 (1956)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[I]t would raise a serious question of constitutional law
whether Congress could subject to arbitration litigation in the federal courts which is
there solely because [of diversity jurisdiction] . . . in disregard of the law of the State
in which a federal court is sitting.”).
103 See, e.g., Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 NW. U. L. REV.
427, 427–28 (1958) (“Erie does indeed have a constitutional basis—in the sense that
our system of federalism is rooted in the Constitution, and that the failure of a federal
court to give due regard to state law or to federal law, as the case may be, inevitably
thwarts the constitutional scheme of things.”); Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words
on Erie—The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1682, 1683–88 (1974) (discussing the general
concept of separation of powers as the constitutional underpinning of Erie); Hart,
supra note 9, at 512 (describing the “constitutional problem of Erie” as “the need of
recognizing the state courts as organs of coordinate authority with other branches of
state government in the discharge of the constitutional functions of the states”).
104 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-2\NDL203.txt

612

unknown

Seq: 34

notre dame law review

19-FEB-14

12:43

[vol. 89:2

a sensible dividing line,105 leading to tortured efforts to distinguish,
for example, substantive rules from procedural rules.106 The RDA is
thus a choice of law rule that fails to identify a clear category of laws to
which it applies.
Second, the RDA is circular. The potential value of the RDA as a
positive constraint on choice of law is that it might identify cases
where state law applies, yet it assumes a prior understanding of the
phrase “in cases where they apply.”
A revisionist interpretation seeks to sidestep the circularity problem by positing that the phrase “where they apply” requires federal
courts to determine which state’s law applies, rather than whether state
law applies, when federal law does not control.107 Yet this interpretation leaves no room for the application of anything other than state or
federal law and therefore excludes foreign law in alienage cases.
There is no reason to believe that Congress intended to exclude foreign law. Indeed, the statute that included the earliest version of the
RDA also vested alienage jurisdiction in the circuit courts, raising the
prospect that foreign law would be relevant.108 This problem can be
avoided by tweaking the revisionist interpretation to posit that federal
diversity courts applying foreign law do so because state choice of law
rules select the foreign law as a rule of decision. Federal courts invoking foreign law would therefore still comply with the RDA by
“apply[ing]” the state choice of law rule. But that tweak begs the
105 See Jerome A. Hoffman, Thinking Out Loud About the Myth of Erie: Plus a Good
Word For Section 1652, 70 MISS. L.J. 163, 183–87 (2000) (discussing competing interpretations of “rules of decision”).
106 Cf. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 559 (1949) (Rutledge,
J., dissenting) (“The accepted dichotomy [in Erie jurisprudence] is the familiar ‘procedural-substantive’ one. This of course is a subject of endless discussion, which
hardly needs to be repeated here. Suffice it to say that actually in many situations
procedure and substance are so interwoven that rational separation becomes wellnigh impossible. But, even so, this fact cannot dispense with the necessity of making a
distinction.”).
107 See LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 423 (4th ed. 2009).
Efforts to salvage the otherwise circular RDA try to avoid what proponents view as a
“nonsensical” conclusion that the Act enables federal common law to prevent state
law from “apply[ing]” despite never acknowledging the existence of federal common
law. MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 121 (2d ed. 1990). However, even if the RDA makes little sense, that may
be less a reason to reinterpret it than a consequence of the RDA’s enactment in an
era that did not anticipate the future prevalence of federal common law. See Louise
Weinberg, The Curious Notion That the Rules of Decision Act Blocks Supreme Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 860, 866 (1989) (“[T]he [RDA] comes down to us as a
relic of a prepositivist, prerealist time.”).
108 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78.
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question of whether federal common law can displace state choice of
law rules in alienage cases.109 If federal common law can govern
choice of law in federal court, then the court’s choice about whether
to apply state law, federal law, foreign law, or general law is itself a
federal question that analytically precedes the RDA’s conclusion that
state law should “apply.” Viewing the RDA’s “where they apply” language as governing which state’s law applies therefore would not avoid
the circular inquiry of whether state law applies.110
Third, the RDA’s reference to “laws of the several states” could
refer not to the laws of any particular state, but rather to the laws of
the states in the aggregate. This interpretation—which is contested in
a debate in which I take no side—could justify choosing general law
even in cases governed by the RDA.111 Another similarly delimiting
possible reading of the phrase “laws of the several states” is that it
implicitly distinguishes between “local” law, which is binding in federal court, and “general” law, which is not.112 These fine distinctions,
which were “indistinct” even at the time,113 seem alien today, but resonated with contemporary taxonomies of law.114
Finally, even if the RDA had a clear meaning, it did not fully
cover the terrain that Erie’s broad language purported to encompass.
The version of the RDA in effect when Erie was decided did not cover
equity cases,115 even though the Court extended Erie to cover equita109 See supra Section I.A; infra subsection III.C.1.
110 Cf. Kevin M. Clermont, The Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 987, 998–1000 n.45 (2011) (contending that “the RDA leaves the courts free” to
apply a “judicially developed choice-of-law technique”).
111 Compare Sherry, supra note 5, at 134–37 (endorsing this interpretation, but
focusing on federal common law rather than general law as the alternative to individual state laws), with Ernest A. Young, A General Defense of Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2013) (rejecting this interpretation).
112 Fletcher, supra note 38, at 1516–17; cf. Michael G. Collins, The Diversity Theory
of the Alien Tort Statute, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 649, 663 (2002) (observing that the RDA
might allow federal courts to apply the “unwritten law of nations” even if such law is
not federal common law because it clearly is not state law).
113 Fletcher, supra note 38, at 1533.
114 See id. at 1517–38. Yet another possible interpretation partially supporting
Swift is that even if the RDA expressly required federal courts to apply state common
law, that would “not necessarily” mean that federal courts were obligated to respect
state court opinions. Nelson, supra note 5, at 955 (“In 1789, people did not automatically treat the phrase ‘unwritten or common law’ as a synonym for ‘judicial
decisions.’ ”).
115 Compare 1 Rev. Stat. § 721 (1875) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 725) (limiting RDA’s
scope to “trials at common law”), with Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, 944
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1652) (amending RDA to encompass “civil actions”).
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ble rights.116 Relying on the RDA to animate Erie would require both
interpreting the statute in a way that provides useful guidance while
also articulating a foundation for Erie when the statute was silent. Yet
if Erie has a foundation independent from the RDA, it is not clear that
the RDA adds anything of value.
Unsurprisingly, courts have deemed the RDA superfluous since
early in the nineteenth century, noting that it “has been uniformly
held to be no more than a declaration of what the law would have
been without it.”117 The analysis in this subsection supports the RDA’s
historical marginalization, such that the RDA is not a plausible source
of positive guidance for the Erie doctrine.
In sum, a central unresolved puzzle of Erie is whether it has any
foundation in positive law, what that foundation might be for each of
Erie’s four components, and how that foundation would influence the
doctrine’s development.
B. The Puzzle of Non-Positive Constraints:
Is Erie a Brooding Omnipresence?
Whether or not Erie has a foundation in positive law, it may also
have a foundation elsewhere. So a second puzzle is determining what
these relatively amorphous foundations might be and how they can
animate various stages of the Erie inquiry.
Framing the problem requires thinking about Erie outside the
context of the United States legal system. Recall that the Erie doctrine
serves a specific function: it limits the discretion of judges to choose
which rules they will apply. In effect, Erie posits that laws emerge from
different sources (such as different sovereigns, different institutions
within sovereigns, or customary practices), and that laws from a particular source have a greater claim to authority in particular cases. Erie’s
role is to help judges make what Justice Frankfurter termed a “sharper
analysis” of law’s “true source.”118 Viewed at this level of abstraction,
Erie performs a role that exists in every legal system purporting to follow the rule of law.
116 See Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111 (1945) (“To make an exception to
Erie . . . on the equity side of a federal court is to reject the considerations of policy
which . . . led to that decision.”).
117 Hawkins v. Barney’s Lessee, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 457, 464 (1831); see Fletcher, supra
note 38, at 1527 (“[E]ven if [the RDA] had never been enacted, the federal courts
would have followed the local law of the states in cases where it applied.”). Nevertheless, courts continue to cite the RDA. See, e,g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 417 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and in the
judgment).
118 York, 326 U.S. at 112.
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Choice of law has been fodder for treatise writers in well-developed legal systems for centuries.119 The “true source” of law has been
understood differently over time, such that older choice of law rules
do not always fit well in new eras (which was a fate that befell Swift).120
But however law was understood, choice of law has long been deemed
important.
Given that early courts in multiple jurisdictions following the conventional wisdom of their eras could muddle through choice of law
without the positive law sources cited in Erie, one can wonder whether
Erie itself can survive without those sources. For example, if the RDA
did not exist, surely we would not conclude that federal courts confronting a conflict of laws may choose whatever rules they feel like
applying based on whim.121 The Constitution itself might help make
that choice—indeed, the grant of diversity jurisdiction implies the
need for a choice of law rule122—but the sheer variety of constitutional arguments used to justify Erie belies any clear textual
mandate.123
If the Constitution’s text does not clearly require a particular
choice, perhaps there are arguments about which choice is better that
have nothing to do with the text. These arguments either predated
the Constitution (such as general theories about choice of law) or
arose independently (such as innovations in jurisprudential theories
about the nature of law). Erie would thus incorporate background
principles that are extra-constitutional. Relying on extra-constitutional authority may seem odd, but courts often look beyond the Constitution in other contexts involving the allocation of power in a
federal system.124
119 The first choice of law treatise in English was written in 1834. See William F.
Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 26 (1963) (citing STORY,
supra note 48). The preface to that treatise cited dozens of works in several languages
dating to the fourteenth century. STORY, supra note 48, at xi–xiv.
120 See Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 252–56 (1992) (summarizing historical evolution of choice of law doctrine).
121 See supra note 117 (noting that courts have viewed the RDA as superfluous).
122 TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 107, at 423.
123 See supra Section II.A.
124 See, e.g., D’Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165, 174 (1850) (citing “wellestablished rules of international law” as aids to understanding the Constitution’s
framework for interstate comity and enforcement of judgments); Thompson v. The
Catharina, 23 F. Cas. 1028, 1030 (D. Pa. 1795) (No. 13,949) (observing in the context
of maritime law that “the change in the form of our government has not abrogated all
the laws, customs and principles of jurisprudence, we inherited from our ancestors,
and possessed at the period of our becoming an independent nation”). For a discus-
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If this reasoning about Erie’s pre-constitutional or extra-constitutional foundation is sensible, two conclusions follow. First, citing the
Constitution or RDA might be neither necessary nor sufficient to
resolve particular Erie questions. If Erie serves a similar role as doctrine in other judicial systems that lack the U.S. Constitution and
RDA, then perhaps it relies at least in part on principles that are
extrinsic to the Constitution and RDA. Identifying those principles
would then become essential to applying Erie. Having some sort of
choice of law regime might be a constitutional requirement, but the
specific content of the regime might be a matter of judicial discretion
absent further statutory guidance or a specific constitutional command relevant to a specific case. As Caleb Nelson has observed, this
discretion would lead to the “ironic conclusion” that Erie at least in
part “might best be characterized as what modern lawyers call ‘federal
common law.’”125 Even more ironically, it would be federal common
law that incorporates general law.
Second, implementing Erie may require federal judges to borrow
principles from choice of law jurisprudence. Resolving conflicts
between seemingly authoritative sources of law requires a metric for
determining how to choose between potentially applicable rules. This
metric might also require reconsidering the scope of the federal rule
to narrow its reach and avoid the conflict. These are the kinds of
inquiries that choice of law jurisprudence has addressed for centuries,
yet Erie does not overtly borrow from this jurisprudence.126
Accordingly, the second puzzle that arises from fragmenting the
Erie doctrine into four steps and focusing on its underlying concerns
requires situating Erie amidst historical analysis of choice of law. Erie
was born from citations to “the Constitution,” but its spirit might have
pre-constitutional and extra-constitutional origins.
***
The discussion in this Part establishes that even if we know what
functions Erie serves, we still need to know what values animate those
functions. This Article focuses primarily on identifying Erie’s funcsion of whether and how preconstitutional norms survived the Founding, see Stephen
E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1813, 1816 (2012). An interesting potential objection to Professor Sachs’s argument—which he acknowledges
and refutes—is that Erie’s hostility to general law precludes relying on atextual background norms. See id. at 1882–84. The irony of the objection is that preconstitutional
general law may animate Erie itself.
125 Nelson, supra note 5, at 985–86; see also Green, supra note 99, at 836 (framing
Swift as resting on “federal common law rules concerning choice of law” that Erie
could have modernized without relying on the Constitution).
126 See infra subsection III.C.1.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-2\NDL203.txt

2013]

unknown

Seq: 39

19-FEB-14

ERIE’S FOUR FUNCTIONS

12:43

617

tions and doctrinal quirks, but the discussion above provides a framework for thinking about the underlying values. Further scholarship
could help illuminate the jurisprudential theories animating Erie and
inform the content of rules implementing Erie.127
III. ERIE’S IMPLEMENTATION: RETHINKING DOCTRINAL PUZZLES
Parts I and II focused on Erie’s functions; this Part focuses on its
form. The morass of cases constituting Erie jurisprudence address several recurring problems that pose enduring puzzles. This Part illustrates how a more nuanced account of Erie’s components can provide
a new perspective on puzzles that have confounded courts and commentators for decades. For each puzzle, courts need to know whether
their task is to create federal law, interpret federal law, prioritize conflicting laws, or adopt non-federal law. Courts likewise must recognize
the difference between choosing an authoritative government, an
authoritative institution within that government, and a rule that the
institution would endorse.
The following sections analyze seven puzzles implicating all four
of Erie’s components. The goal is not to provide definitive answers,
although I do offer some. Instead, the discussion exposes common
themes underlying ostensibly dissimilar puzzles and places each puzzle in a context that helps to identify solutions.
First, analyzing multiple puzzles in the same article highlights
how confusion in each area arises for similar reasons. This similarity is
often difficult to discern because judicial opinions and scholarship
usually address individual puzzles in isolation. Each problem might
therefore appear to be difficult for idiosyncratic reasons. The analysis
in this Part reveals that many puzzles arise from or become more difficult because of a shared pathology: a failure to parse Erie into its components. Each puzzle may raise some unique issues, but a more
precise account of Erie’s distinct components would place those issues
in a context that can lead to better solutions.
Second, the analysis in this Part situates each puzzle within one of
Erie’s components and shows how that context can lead to doctrinal
reform. A more precise account of where each puzzle fits within the
127 For examples of such efforts focused on modern choice of law theories, see
Roosevelt, supra note 8, at 15 (“[T]he choice-of-law perspective gives us a simpler
understanding of what is at stake in Erie analysis.”); Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of
General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 537–39 (2006) (using the concept of “policy
bundles” to highlight the interplay between choice of law principles and rules governing how judges craft federal common law).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-2\NDL203.txt

618

unknown

Seq: 40

notre dame law review

19-FEB-14

12:43

[vol. 89:2

broad Erie landscape helps determine what questions courts should
ask and how to formulate coherent answers.
A. Creation and the Puzzle of General Law: When Can Federal Common
Law Incorporate or Choose General Law Rules that
Could Not Apply of Their Own Force?
Erie’s central holding that “[t]here is no federal general common
law” walks a semantic tightrope between the concepts of “federal common law” and “general common law.”128 Shaking the rope highlights
how Erie failed to articulate a normative theory that could shape the
role of general law in the federal system. The potential utility of such
a theory is evident in debates about whether federal common law
should apply in some diversity cases and about the status of customary
international law in United States courts.
The Court in Erie could not reject “federal common law” because
federal courts routinely apply such law in multiple contexts. Judges
and scholars often do not agree on when to apply and how to craft
federal common law. But there is a broad consensus that courts can
create federal common law in at least some cases that need a federal
solution, but for which the Constitution, legislative action, and executive action have not directly supplied an answer.129 Examples include
rules governing interstate and foreign relations, the federal government’s proprietary interests, and admiralty.130
128 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
129 For a discussion of competing theories of when, why, and how federal common
law operates, see Clark, supra note 38; Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of
Federal Common Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 585 (2006); Martin H. Redish, Federal Common
Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretative Process: An “Institutionalist” Perspective, 83
NW. U. L. REV. 761 (1989); Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common
Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881 (1986); Alfred Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal
Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024 (1967).
130 See Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981).
Recent scholarship explores how additional clusters of federal judicial opinions
outside the canonical categories constitute an often overlooked form of federal common law. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation:
Erie for the Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753, 755 (2013) (“[F]ederal courts
have spent the last century engaged in an under-the-radar enterprise of fashioning
and applying what are arguably hundreds of federal common law doctrines to questions of federal statutory interpretation.”); Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common
Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 815 (2008) (“While the sources of and limits upon federal
court power to develop substantive common law have received serious and sustained
scholarly attention, the sources of and limits upon federal court power to develop
procedural common law have been almost entirely overlooked.”).
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Likewise, the Court could not deny the existence of “general
common law” because the Court itself had been diligently consulting
such law since the Founding. Justice Brandeis doubted whether general law was a stable and legitimate source of judicial authority.131
However, he could not deny general law’s historical and contemporary salience as a source of ideas and guidance.132 Indeed, on the
same day the Court decided Erie, Justice Brandeis filed another majority opinion applying a “federal common law” rule of “equitable apportionment” for resolving interstate water disputes.133 That judicially
created rule apparently borrowed from general law, which did not
seem to disturb the Court.134
The continued vitality of general law is consistent with Brandeis’s
endorsement of Justice Holmes’s argument that “law in the sense of
which courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite
authority behind it.”135 A central premise of Holmes’s critique was
that prior decisions had deemed general law “obligatory” rather than
merely available.136 Erie eliminated the obligatory component of general law, mooting further discussion of what role, if any, general law
might play in a federal system. By this deft maneuver, Erie avoided
saying that general law did not exist and held instead that general law
was not binding in diversity cases.137
Given that “federal common law” and “general common law”
both survived Erie, the Court was careful to condemn only “federal
general common law.” Yet that novel term apparently had never
131 See Erie, 304 U.S. at 74 (noting “the impossibility of discovering a satisfactory
line of demarcation between the province of general law and that of local law” and
how that impossibility created “uncertainties”); id. at 79 (discussing the “fallacy underlying” Swift’s endorsement of “transcendental” law (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
132 See infra notes 139–48 and accompanying text.
133 Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 102, 110
(1938).
134 Hinderlider relied on a prior decision which in turn claimed to be “building
up . . . interstate common law” from unspecified sources. Kansas v. Colorado, 206
U.S. 46, 98 (1907); see also A. Dan Tarlock, The Law of Equitable Apportionment Revisited,
Updated, and Restated, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 381, 394 (1985) (“[T]he Court has never
been very precise about the source of the law of equitable apportionment.”).
135 Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (internal quotation marks omitted).
136 Id.
137 Id. at 79–80. For a discussion of recurring theoretical debates about whether
and how nonpositive law can “exist,” see Lea Brilmayer, Untethered Norms After Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins: Positivism, International Law, and the Return of the “Brooding
Omnipresence,” 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725 (2013).
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appeared in any published judicial opinion before Erie.138 The ambiguous term raises a question: What exactly did Erie reject? If general
law survives in some form, but not as “federal general common law,”
what role can general law continue to play? The answer is not clear
because Erie did not carefully distinguish between rules that incorporate general law and rules that adopt general law of its own force.
Closer attention to the difference between Erie’s creation and adoption inquiries might have highlighted the need for a normative theory
explaining when federal courts can create rules that incorporate general law.
One possible reading of Erie is that its rejection of “federal general common law” means that federal courts can never incorporate general law into federal law. Yet that conclusion is implausibly broad for
three reasons.
First, the Supreme Court has often expressly relied upon general
law after Erie, notably in maritime cases.139 The wisdom of this reliance is debatable.140 But there is little doubt that if a federal court
may craft federal common law in a particular case, then it has discretion to shape the rule (within limits).141 This discretion includes
authority to incorporate general law principles.142 At that point the
138 At least none that are in Westlaw. This statement is based on a search on September 6, 2013 of the ALLCASES database on Westlaw for the phrases “general federal common law” and “federal general common law” before Erie was decided on
April 25, 1938.
139 See E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864 (1986)
(“With admiralty jurisdiction comes the application of substantive admiralty law.
Absent a relevant statute, the general maritime law, as developed by the judiciary,
applies.” (citation omitted)). For examples of other fields in which general law is
relevant, see Nelson, supra note 127, at 508–25.
140 See Allan Erbsen, Constitutional Spaces, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1168, 1247–52 (2011)
[hereinafter Erbsen, Constitutional Spaces] (considering potential justifications for federalizing admiralty law); Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493, 542
(2008) [hereinafter Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism] (same).
141 See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728–29 (1979) (holding
that federal courts have discretion to incorporate state law into federal common law).
142 See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 405–06 (1970) (“[O]ur
decision does not require the fashioning of a whole new body of federal law, but
merely removes a bar to access to the existing general maritime law.”); Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (stating that “general commercial
law” is “a convenient source of reference for fashioning federal rules”); Bellia & Clark,
supra note 40, at 713 (noting that federal common law rules “are often nothing more
than general law rules that the Court has borrowed from customary bodies of law to
implement some feature of the constitutional structure”).
An interesting question is whether courts that incorporate general law are freezing the general rule as it exists at that moment, or also incorporating the evolutionary
character of general law. For example, suppose that in 2012 a federal court decides
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incorporated general law becomes federal law that applies in state
courts under the Supremacy Clause143 and can be the basis for federal
question jurisdiction.144
Second, the Constitution itself incorporates (or at least references) the general law of nations in clauses governing foreign relations.145 This general law is a source that federal courts consult to

that federal common law governs a particular problem and crafts a rule that incorporates the general law. After twenty years, the general law rule has evolved to materially
differ from the version adopted earlier. If a federal court again confronts the same
issue, one can imagine three distinct approaches: it could conclude that the federal
rule: (1) now differs from the general rule yet still applies; (2) is now outdated and
should be replaced with a new federal rule based on the new general law rule; or (3)
has evolved concurrently with the general law that it incorporated. A similar problem
arises when the Constitution’s use of a term might either freeze its meaning or incorporate the possibility of an evolving usage in the community from which the term was
borrowed. See Erbsen, Constitutional Spaces, supra note 140, at 1244 n.283 (noting that
Article I’s reference to the “high Seas” “could refer either to specific waters that in
1789 were encompassed in the international law definition of high seas, or generically
to the international law category of high seas such that the domestic category evolves
along with the international category”). For a discussion of this temporal aspect of
incorporation in the context of a current statute enacted in the nineteenth century
referencing international law’s definition of piracy, see United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d
446, 467–69 (4th Cir. 2012) (applying the modern definition).
143 See U.S. CONST. art. VI. But cf. Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1453–58 (2001) (contending that some federal common law might not fit within the Supremacy Clause’s definition of federal
law). Although the distinction between general and federal law may be clear to a
modern reader, “post-Erie federal common law is rooted in a positivist mindset utterly
foreign to the American common-law tradition of the late 18th century.” Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 745 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment). A Founding-era lawyer might have perceived general law’s origin
in the law of nations as a reason to consider it the “law of the land” in a sense that a
modern lawyer would attribute to federal common law, but not to the type of general
law applied in Swift. Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal Common Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 825, 889–90 (2005).
144 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006); cf. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286, 286
(1875) (holding that a claim arising under “general law” did not raise a “Federal
question” conferring appellate jurisdiction).
145 See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Law of Nations as Constitutional Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 729, 746 (2012) (“[T]he Constitution employs various terms
drawn from the law of nations, such as ‘War,’ ‘Letters of Marque and Reprisal,’ ‘Captures,’ ‘Treaties,’ ‘Ambassadors,’ and ‘admiralty.’ ” (footnotes omitted)); id. at 779
(noting that the “allocation” of foreign affairs powers among the “political branches”
cannot be fully understood without considering the implications of specific powers
under the law of nations).
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explain both the Constitution’s original public meaning and its modern application.146
Third, many statutes incorporate general law as a means of filling
gaps in coverage or implementing a vague governing standard. A rare
explicit example is a statute criminalizing “piracy as defined by the law
of nations.”147 Implicit reliance on general law is more common.148
In sum, reading Erie to reject the incorporation of general law
into federal law is implausible. General law principles permeated federal law before Erie and survived Erie’s repudiation of “federal general
common law.”
Another possible interpretation of Erie is that even if federal
courts can incorporate general law into federal law, they cannot adopt
general law of its own force. On this view, Swift was wrong because it
admitted relying on general law, which it grandiosely claimed—citing
Cicero and Lord Mansfield—was law throughout the “world.”149
Rejecting this aspect of Swift is appealing to a generation instilled with
the positivists’ attempt to ground law in sovereign authority and the
legal realists’ skepticism of law’s pretentions to uniformity.150
But this anti-adoption interpretation is less helpful than it may
seem for two reasons. First, Swift may not have adopted general law
and instead relied on general law because that was the law that New
York courts would have relied upon. If so, Erie’s non-adoption rule
would not address the holding in Swift. Second, even if Swift did
adopt general law, adoption can easily be recharacterized as incorporation. Indeed, it is possible to imagine a hypothetical variation of
146 See id. at 746 (“Accurately decoding [the Founders’] choices requires interpreters to give careful consideration to background principles of the law of nations and
how they interact with the Constitution’s allocation of powers.”). As I have explained
elsewhere:
International law can intersect with constitutional law in three ways that have
generated controversy. International law can have: (1) persuasive force if it
informs judicial understanding of the Constitution’s text, (2) preemptive
force if the Supremacy Clause requires federal courts to apply it and states to
obey it unless and until Congress displaces it, and (3) preeminent force if the
Constitution incorporates international standards.
Erbsen, Constitutional Spaces, supra note 140, at 1244 n.284.
147 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006); see also United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153,
163 & n.a (1820) (defining piracy by reference to a long list of foreign sources,
including several in Latin).
148 For examples, see Nelson, supra note 127, at 519–25.
149 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842). However, one can debate
whether Swift in fact applied general law of its own force. See infra notes 151–56 and
accompanying text.
150 See PURCELL, supra note 16, at 78–79.
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Swift that would survive Erie’s anti-adoption rule and would be unconstitutional only if there is a normative argument against incorporation. Yet, as the following discussion illustrates, Erie never advanced a
normative argument against incorporating general law into federal
common law for purposes of diversity litigation.
On one reading, Swift merely applied New York’s local choice of
law rule, which in turn selected general law.151 The propriety of Swift
would then hinge on whether a federal court could interpret the general law differently than the courts of the state whose choice of law
rule it was enforcing.152 That inquiry requires considering whether
state courts were adopting general law or instead incorporating general law into their own law. Justice Story either overlooked or finessed
this question, noting only that state courts would “deduce” the rule of
decision from general law.153 This phrasing is opaque in a legal environment where courts routinely borrow each other’s ideas. The key
question is what status the idea has after it is borrowed, rather than its
status before it was borrowed. Justice Story focused only on where
New York found rules, not on what those rules became when New
York relied on them.
Moreover, Justice Story began his analysis with an assumption
about New York law that distorted his conclusion about general law.
His opinion observed that New York’s highest court had never
endorsed the outlier holder in due course exception that Swift
rejected,154 but then assumed that the exception would not apply in
federal court even if the state’s highest court had endorsed it.155 The
problem is that because the highest court had not in fact endorsed
the exception, lower courts had no occasion to decide if a higher
court decision would bind them. Yet Justice Story nevertheless opined
that “the Courts of New York do not found their decisions” about the
exception “upon any . . . fixed . . . local usage.”156 This statement is
misleading because it blends the actual content of New York law with
Justice Story’s assumption about what the state’s highest court could
have done. Lower state courts had not relied on a fixed local usage,
151 See Young, supra note 111.
152 A related question is whether a federal court can justify its refusal to follow a
state court’s interpretation of general law on the state court’s own belief that its interpretation was not binding in federal court. For a discussion of this question, see
Michael Steven Green, Erie’s Suppressed Premise, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1111, 1121–27
(2011).
153 Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18.
154 See id. at 16–17.
155 See id. at 18.
156 Id.
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but the highest court had not yet addressed the issue; if the highest
court had addressed the issue—as Justice Story assumed for the sake
of argument—then perhaps that would have created a fixed local
usage. Swift never explored this possibility, and thus never considered
that New York’s highest court in Swift’s hypothetical scenario could
have incorporated general law into New York law rather than merely
applied general law.
Accordingly, Swift might have been wrong for a different reason
than the Court assumed in Erie. It is possible that the Swift court
thought that New York’s choice of law rules selected general law, but
erred either because New York courts in fact incorporated general law
into local law, or because federal courts must follow state court interpretations even of general law.
Alternatively, Erie may have correctly concluded that Swift
adopted general law. Nevertheless, Erie’s anti-adoption rule would be
ineffective if adoption can be recharacterized as incorporation.
When a federal court sitting in diversity relies upon the general
commercial law and treats it as independent of state law, one can say
either that the court is adopting general law or that the court is incorporating general law into the “federal common law of diversity litigation in federal court.” Such a hypothetical body of federal law that
would apply only in a federal forum seems strange, but is not entirely
fanciful. Federal courts already craft common law to govern the
“administration of justice.”157 These rules are no less “federal law”
than the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, even though both apply
primarily in federal courts.158 Similarly, federal courts could eventually create a uniquely federal choice of law rule to replace the current
practice under Klaxon v. Stentor Electric159 of using the forum state’s
choice of law rule.160 This federal common law might preempt state

157 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 501 (3d ed. 2000); see
also Barrett, supra note 130, at 823 (discussing federal common law “primarily concerned with the regulation of court processes and in-courtroom conduct”).
158 In theory, federal procedural common law—and even FRCP provisions—could
apply in state courts when entangled with substantive federal rights, although in practice this is unlikely. See Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 923 (1997) (observing that
federal courts should respect “a State’s consistent application of its neutral procedural
rules”); Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994) (holding that “procedural” federal forum non conveniens doctrine need not apply in state court admiralty
action); cf. FED R. CIV. P. 1 (limiting scope of rules to “proceedings in the United
States district courts”).
159 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
160 See infra subsection III.D.1.
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law even in state court, but it also might apply only in federal courts as
a means of mitigating interstate friction in diversity cases.161
Even if federal common law cannot incorporate general law in
diversity cases, federal common law still might be able to choose general law. If a federal common law choice of law rule is possible in
diversity litigation, it is only a small step to argue that the federal
choice of law rule might favor applying something other than state law
as a rule of decision—for example, the general commercial law.162
Justice Story thus could have tried to salvage his holding in Swift simply by writing something along the lines of: Article III’s grant of diversity jurisdiction authorizes federal courts to create a choice of law rule,
which we apply today to conclude that the general commercial law is
the optimal source of rules governing disputes about the validity of
commercial paper that moves between states. If that gambit would
have preserved Swift’s holding, then Erie is less revolutionary than it
seems.
A modern critic might respond to this reimagining of Swift by
contending that federal courts cannot create a choice of law rule for
diversity cases that has the effect of displacing state law with general
law. For that objection to succeed, there must be a normative theory
about why the existence of diversity jurisdiction does not authorize
federal courts to create a choice of law rule that displaces state law
with general law. Yet Erie does not offer such a theory. Erie briefly
identifies a rationale for diversity jurisdiction,163 but does not attempt
to develop a general theory of federal common law that could help
distinguish between permissible and impermissible uses of general law
in diversity cases. Subsequent opinions have reconsidered pre-Erie
precedents that created federal common law with insufficient analysis.164 But these case-by-case efforts do not create a broad theory that
161 See infra notes 230–31.
162 Indeed, “general commercial law” is already an option when federal courts
apply federal choice of law rules in federal question cases. Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943). For a discussion of whether relying on general commercial law in diversity cases can be sensible as a matter of policy, see Nelson,
supra note 5, at 946–49.
163 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938) (noting the risk of “discrimination” by the forum state against noncitizens).
164 See, e.g., Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 217–18 (1997) (“We recognize . . .
that this Court did once articulate federal common-law corporate governance standards, applicable to federally chartered banks. But the Court found its rules of decision in federal common law long before [Erie] . . . . We conclude that . . . [these rules
did not survive Erie] and that . . . state law, not federal common law, provides the
applicable rules for decision.” (citations omitted)); cf. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S.
647, 651 (1963) (“As respects the creation by the federal courts of common-law rights,

R
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could justify reading Erie to bar application of general law in federal
court.
The current status of general law thus presents a lingering puzzle.
After Erie, deeming a rule to be “general law” is insufficient to justify
its adoption in federal court. But that limit is easily circumvented if
federal courts may create federal common law that incorporates or
chooses general law.
Another practical example of how the adoption/incorporation
distinction can be important is the current debate over whether customary international law (CIL) applies in federal courts.165 CIL is a
form of general law and thus might apply in federal court for two
reasons: if it is a rule of decision that federal law adopts, or if federal
lawmakers can create federal law that incorporates CIL. The debate
over CIL’s status tends to focus on what I characterize as the adoption
issue; i.e., whether CIL simply is federal common law of its own
force.166 But the incorporation issue is equally interesting.
Even if CIL is not itself a form of federal common law, it is still a
distinct body of general law that a federal choice of law rule might
select to govern a particular dispute. The challenging questions after
Erie would be whether a federal court may fashion a federal common
law choice of law rule to justify applying CIL and whether this choice
of law rule would also apply in state courts.167 In this framework, not
all CIL would be federal common law, but some federal common law
would incorporate CIL.
Erie’s rejection of “federal general common law” would thus raise
the question of whether some forms of “general common law” can still
it is perhaps needless to state that we are not in the free-wheeling days antedating
Erie.” (citation omitted)).
165 For further explanation of why I draw this distinction, see supra notes 9–15 and
accompanying text.
166 For early salvos in the debate, compare Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith,
Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110
HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997) (contending that customary international law should not be
treated as federal common law), with Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really
State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998) (responding to Bradley and Goldsmith).
For more recent discussions of competing views about CIL’s status, see Bellia & Clark,
supra note 145, at 828–37; Carlos M. Vázquez, Customary International Law as U.S. Law:
A Critique of the Revisionist and Intermediate Positions and a Defense of the Modern Position,
86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1617–33 (2011); Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate
over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 391–404 (2002).
167 See Daniel J. Meltzer, Customary International Law, Foreign Affairs, and Federal
Common Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L LAW 513, 536–54 (2002) (considering potential justifications for, and limits on, a federal common law choice of law rule governing cases
implicating foreign relations).
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find a home within “federal common law.” Moreover, the new choice
of law rule incorporating CIL would be an example of what Section
I.A described as a blurring of Erie’s creation and prioritization functions: the judicial power to create law would generate a rule governing
the resolution of conflicts between law from different sources.
Accordingly, the fuzzy distinction between “federal common law,”
“general common law,” and “federal general common law” that Justice Brandeis sought to finesse cannot be so easily evaded. A theory of
what values Erie promotes requires a concurrent theory of what values
determine the scope of federal common law.168 Otherwise, the judiciary’s ability to create federal common law that incorporates or
chooses general law would swallow the prohibition against adopting
general law. Here again, a sensible account of Erie requires considering its distinct components. We cannot know what law a court may
prioritize without knowing what law a court may create and how
courts may shape and interpret the content of that law.
B. Interpretation
The prior Section illustrated how Erie’s creation component
determines whether a particular institution is authorized to create a
particular federal rule. This Section considers how Erie’s interpretation component determines whether the federal rule encompasses a
disputed issue on which state law might otherwise apply. Interpreting
a rule requires determining its scope. But how? Two interesting puzzles arise: Should federal courts have a default rule for interpreting
the scope of ambiguous statutes or rules, and how should the content
of state law influence the interpretation of federal law?
1. The Puzzle of Interpretative Canons: Avoiding or Embracing
Conflict
Imagine a diversity case in which the court must decide whether
to allow discovery of several entries in the defendant’s personal diary.
A hypothetical federal procedural rule provides that “the court may
allow parties to discover the content of personal diaries only on a
showing of good cause.” Meanwhile, a statute in the defendant’s
home state creates “a right to privacy that prevents any court from
168 The Supreme Court was therefore imprecise when it stated that “the principles
recognized in Erie place no limit on a federal court’s power to fashion federal common law rules necessary to effectuate a [particular] remedy founded on federal law.”
Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 101 n.6 (1991). The holding in Erie is
irrelevant when federal common law expatiates federal law, but the principles animating Erie help determine what constitutes federal common law.
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ordering disclosure of the contents of a personal diary unless the
information is essential to proving a claim or defense and unavailable
from other sources.” The court must determine the appropriate standard governing access to the diary.
Before we can decide whether the federal or state rule has priority in a diversity case, we must decide whether they conflict. A broad
reading of the federal rule suggests a conflict because the phrase
“good cause” arguably permits discovery in more situations than does
the state statute. For example, perhaps the diary is relevant but not
essential, or the information within it is obtainable elsewhere, but not
without substantial cost. A narrow reading of the federal rule would
avoid a conflict because the term “good cause” could incorporate
respect for state privacy rights, such that the diary is discoverable in
federal court only if it would be discoverable in state court. If the
phrase “good cause” is truly ambiguous (e.g., context and drafting history do not illuminate its scope), then neither the broad nor narrow
interpretation is obviously preferable.
Yet perhaps the values underlying Erie place a thumb on one side
of the scale, favoring a broad or narrow reading that would create or
avoid friction between federal and state law. In other words, does
Erie’s interpretative component include a default canon for ambiguous federal rules in circumstances where state law is arguably relevant?
Identifying a default rule governing interpretation requires
resolving a normative question that might have different answers in
different contexts. There are three possible defaults: when a federal
rule does not have a clearly defined scope, the court can err in favor
of a broad or narrow interpretation, or it can aim to avoid erring in
either direction. Favoring a broad interpretation is akin to concluding that federal law should not eschew conflict with state law and may
even embrace conflict. On this view, the fact that a federal rule
extends federal power is a feature, not a bug. In contrast, favoring a
narrow interpretation is akin to adopting an avoidance canon that
privileges state law and assumes that federal lawmakers want to minimize infringement of state prerogatives. The middle approach tries to
avoid an error in either direction, although in practice this would be
difficult to achieve when the statute is amenable to multiple interpretations. Neither the broad nor narrow default is obviously superior
because reasonable minds can disagree on the normative and practi-
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cal implications of shading statutory interpretation in different
directions.169
The optimal default might also vary by context. For example,
federal statutes or regulations might have a presumptively broad
scope when they address traditional federal interests (such as the military or foreign relations) and a presumptively narrow scope when they
address matters traditionally subject to state regulation (such as tort
law). Likewise, interpreting federal law to be consistent with state law
might be more important in some contexts (such as litigation procedure, where disuniformity creates a risk of forum shopping),170 than
in other contexts (such as when federal regulations ensure vertical
and horizontal uniformity by preempting all state law in the field).
These sorts of normative questions are beyond the scope of this Article, so I will not propose a particular default rule for Erie’s interpretation component.171
However, if there is an interpretative default one way or another,
courts should be precise about defining it so that they do not arbitrarily misinterpret federal law. That precision is absent from current
jurisprudence.
For example, consider three cases addressing whether a particular question was within the scope of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
(FRCP). In Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., the Court interpreted Rule 3
not to govern the question of what conduct (such as filing or serving a
complaint) commences litigation for purposes of compliance with a
state statute of limitations.172 The Court acknowledged that its task
was to determine “whether the scope of the Federal Rule in fact is
sufficiently broad to control the issue.”173 In undertaking that interpretative inquiry, the Court expressly selected a default rule, stating
that the FRCP should be given “their plain meaning” and should not
be “narrowly construed” to avoid a conflict with state law.174 Yet sixteen years later, the Court seemed to deny having adopted this default
rule. In Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.,175 the Court cited
169 A similar debate influences application of the avoidance canon in constitutional interpretation. See generally William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions
as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831 (2001).
170 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 405 n.7
(2010).
171 For a broader discussion of how default assumptions can aid in implementing
Erie, see Erbsen, supra note 78.
172 446 U.S. 740, 743–44 (1980).
173 Id. at 749.
174 Id. at 750 n.9.
175 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
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Walker for the proposition that the FRCP should be “interpreted . . .
with sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies.”176
Gasperini thus suggested, contrary to Walker, that the FRCP should be
narrowly construed to avoid conflicts with state interests. Gasperini’s
meaning remains opaque because of the Court’s fragmented decision
in Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Insurance Co., which required
the Court to determine the scope of FRCP 23.177 In Shady Grove, all
three opinions purported to endorse Gasperini’s default rule, yet all
three disagreed about how that default operated.178
Accordingly, a fair reading of current Erie jurisprudence is that
the Court acknowledges the utility of having a default rule for interpreting the scope of FRCP provisions, but lacks a stable and determinate account of what that default requires. Thinking about Erie’s
interpretation component as being distinct from its prioritization
component can help clarify the importance of this default and highlight the normative concerns that shape the default.179
2. The Puzzle of Comparisons: Identifying Conflict with State Law
Determining the content of state law is obviously important after
the prioritization inquiry concludes that a federal court must apply
state law. If state law governs an issue, the court must know what the
law requires. But the content of state law also influences the antecedent question of whether state law applies.
Deciding whether federal law applies to a dispute can require
considering the alternatives that might apply instead. For example,
interpreting the scope of federal common law can sometimes require
determining the content of state law. Federal common law by default
incorporates state law when a uniform national rule is unnecessary,
but there is an exception when a particular state law “prejudice[s]
176 Id. at 427 n.7.
177 559 U.S. 393 (2010).
178 See id. at 405 n.7 (rejecting Gasperini’s emphasis on “important” state interests,
but agreeing that the FRCP should be interpreted to avoid disuniformity in state and
federal procedure); id. at 421–22 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (“agree[ing]” with the dissent’s reliance on Gasperini’s reference to important
state interests, but “disagree[ing]” about the “degree to which the meaning of federal
rules may be contorted . . . to accommodate state policy goals”); id. at 442–43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court veers away from [Gasperini] . . . in favor of a mechanical reading of Federal Rules, insensitive to state interests and productive of
discord.”).
179 See Erbsen, supra note 78 (discussing the need for an “Erie canon”).
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federal interests.”180 Whether federal common law incorporates state
law thus depends in part on the content of potentially applicable state
rules. Likewise, the practical consequences of applying state law can
influence a court’s assessment of whether to treat an issue as falling
within the scope of federal authority.181 This inquiry blends Erie’s
interpretation and prioritization components by considering which
issues federal law addresses and whether federal law’s treatment of
those issues displaces inconsistent state rules. Whether one frames
the problem as one of interpretation or prioritization, applying Erie
requires information about the content of state law.
Erie’s interpretation component therefore can raise the same
kinds of questions as its adoption component. Both require identifying the source and content of rules that would supplant federal law in
federal court. Yet questions arise about how to conduct these inquiries. To avoid duplication, I address these questions below in Section
III.D, which discusses the adoption inquiry.
C. Prioritization
If federal law exists and extends to an issue, the next question is
whether federal law has priority over conflicting state law. Current
doctrine implementing this inquiry suffers from at least two flaws.
First, courts have a needlessly myopic focus that overlooks potential
lessons from analogous choice of law contexts. Second, courts rely on
a distinction between common law and other types of federal law that
is both theoretically and practically unsound.
1. The Puzzle of Erie’s Scope: Choice of Law Along Multiple
Dimensions of Federalism
Thinking about Erie in the context of prioritization raises a question about whether Erie’s choice of law inquiry is uniquely different
from the inquiries that arise in other choice of law scenarios that are
at least partially analogous. If Erie addresses a unique problem, then
thinking about why the problem is unique might help pinpoint what
values the Erie doctrine promotes and how it should operate. If the
180 United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 736 n.37 (1979); see also
United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 595 (1973) (“[E]ven if . . .
state property law should generally govern federal land acquisitions . . . the particular
[Louisiana] rule of law before us today . . . may not.”).
181 See, e.g., Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 539 (1958)
(holding that state law generally should not apply when it would “disrupt or alter the
essential character or function of a federal court”).
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Erie context is not unique, then lessons from analogous areas of jurisprudence might inform understanding of Erie.
Choice of law problems within a federal system arise in three scenarios for which we can attach distinct labels: a federal court might
apply state law (vertical top-down review), a state court might apply
federal law (vertical bottom-up review), and a state court might apply
the law of another state (horizontal choice of law).182 Erie’s traditional scope encompasses only the vertical top-down scenario.183 The
vertical bottom-up scenario is sometimes called “reverse-Erie,”184
although it also partially overlaps with jurisprudence governing preemption.185 The horizontal choice of law scenario is typically not
understood as raising any kind of Erie issue.186 Instead, a distinct body
of constitutional law governed by the Full Faith and Credit and Due
Process Clauses overlays a set of choice of law rules that vary from state
to state.187
Despite sitting in three distinct doctrinal silos, the three choice of
law scenarios are similar. In each, a judge must consider that: (1) in a
federal system multiple sovereigns create conflicting rules; (2) criteria
are necessary to resolve conflicts in a way that respects relevant constitutional, statutory, and prudential concerns; and (3) those criteria
address questions such as the scope of each sovereign’s lawmaking
power, the relation of the sovereigns to each other, and the policies
underlying the conflicting rules. Viewed in this light, it is striking that
very little scholarship about Erie addresses reverse-Erie, and that
almost none addresses horizontal choice of law.188 A comprehensive
182 More complicated issues arise when either type of court might apply foreign,
international, or tribal law, but for present purposes I want to address only the kinds
of traditional federalism problems on which most discussions of Erie focus.
183 See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996) (choosing
between New York law and federal law); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965)
(choosing between Massachusetts law and federal law).
184 Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 223 (1986) (noting that
“reverse-Erie” requires “substantive remedies afforded by the States” in state courts to
“conform to governing federal maritime standards”).
185 See Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 7 (2006).
186 For examples of scholarship situating Erie within a broader choice of law
framework, see Joseph P. Bauer, Shedding Light on Shady Grove: Further Reflections on
the Erie Doctrine from a Conflicts Perspective, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 939 (2011); Green,
supra note 14; Roosevelt, supra note 8; Louise Weinberg, Back to the Future: The New
General Common Law, 35 J. MAR. L. & COM. 523 (2004); Ernest A. Young, Preemption at
Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273 (1999).
187 See RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 620–86 (5th
ed. 2006).
188 But see sources cited supra notes 185–86. An observation that might partially
explain the fragmentation of scholarship about choice of law in a federal system is
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account of choice of law in a federal system might well conclude that
each context raises different concerns that require different criteria.
But that conclusion is not self-evident and some conceptual overlap is
inevitable.189
Courts currently take distinct approaches to the three inquiries,
raising questions about why an approach that is sensible in one context is inapplicable in the others. For example, the horizontal choice
of law inquiry often assigns priority based in part on whether application of a particular rule would create “unfair[ ] surprise[ ],”190 which
is not a factor that appears in the Court’s vertical top-down jurisprudence.191 Likewise, the vertical bottom-up inquiry emphasizes
whether state procedures are “outcome-determinative,”192 while the
that the topic is often split between different courses: Civil Procedure (Erie), Federal
Courts (reverse-Erie), and Conflicts (horizontal choice of law). In prior work, I noted
an analogous phenomenon in the context of personal jurisdiction doctrine.
Although constitutional law governing personal jurisdiction shares common features
and concerns with constitutional law governing other aspects of horizontal federalism, courts and commentators rarely situate personal jurisdiction doctrine within a
broader constitutional context. I speculated that one reason for this doctrinal divide
might be that scholars who teach and write about constitutional law often teach different courses and are part of different academic communities than scholars who teach
and write about personal jurisdiction. See Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60
EMORY L.J. 1, 72–74 (2010).
189 See Clermont, supra note 185, at 4; Roosevelt, supra note 8, at 24. For a rare
modern example of a Supreme Court opinion noting the intersection of Erie and
reverse-Erie, see Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 307 n.3 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(“A federal court applying state law . . . is not free to follow its own federal rule simply
because the issue arises in federal court. By the same token, a state court considering
a federal constitutional claim . . . is not free to follow its own state-law view on the
question simply because the issue arises in state court.”).
190 See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730 (1988) (holding that a state
court’s application of forum law did not violate due process because the defendant
was not “unfairly surprised”).
191 Another potential inconsistency between the horizontal and top-down inquiries is that the Full Faith and Credit Clause permits states to apply their own procedural statutes because “the procedural rules of its courts are surely matters on which a
State is competent to legislate.” Id. at 722. If the same preference for forum rules
extends to procedural common law, it would differ from the top-down inquiry’s
assumption that federal procedural common law does not automatically apply in federal court even to cases within its scope. See infra subsection III.C.2. The Court has
not addressed whether Wortman extends to procedural common law, but the Restatement apparently assumes that it does. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 122 (1971) (indicating that a forum “usually applies” its own “rules prescribing how litigation shall be conducted” and not suggesting an exclusion for common
law rules).
192 Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 151 (1988).
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top-down inquiry does not.193 In contrast, the top-down inquiry
emphasizes the difference between federal statutes and common
law,194 while the bottom-up inquiry does not.195 The two vertical
inquiries also differ in their approach to Erie’s adoption component.
The top-down inquiry seeks to avoid forum shopping by requiring federal courts to apply the same rules that would apply in local state
courts.196 Yet the bottom-up inquiry encourages forum shopping
because state courts, unlike federal district courts, are not required to
follow precedent from the federal circuit for their region.197 As a
result, the content of federal law can differ between state and federal
courts in the same state.198
Accordingly, thinking about the concerns animating Erie requires
reconsidering whether Erie should fit within a broader jurisprudence
governing choice of law in a federal system. If Erie is less unique than
commonly assumed, then it might draw guidance from analogous doc193 Compare id. (reverse-Erie case relying on precedent focusing on outcomes), with
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466–67 (1965) (Erie case stating that the same precedent’s focus on outcomes “was never intended to serve as a talisman”); see also FALLON
ET AL., supra note 77, at 425 n.5 (noting inconsistency between Felder and Hanna).
194 See infra subsection III.C.2.
195 See Clermont, supra note 185 (exhaustively reviewing reverse-Erie jurisprudence and not identifying the statute/common law distinction as a relevant factor);
id. at 44 (lumping together federal “constitutional, statutory, or common law” when
discussing reverse-Erie).
196 See infra subsection III.D.2.
197 See Freeman v. Lane, 962 F.2d 1252, 1258 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he Supremacy
Clause did not require the Illinois courts to follow Seventh Circuit precedent interpreting the Fifth Amendment.”); Abela v. Gen. Motors Corp., 677 N.W.2d 325, 327
(Mich. 2004) (“Although state courts are bound by the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court construing federal law, there is no similar obligation with respect to
decisions of the lower federal courts.” (citation omitted)); cf. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506
U.S. 364, 376 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The Supremacy Clause demands that
state law yield to federal law, but neither federal supremacy nor any other principle of
federal law requires that a state court’s interpretation of federal law give way to a
(lower) federal court’s interpretation.”). In practice, courts in different states use
several distinct methods for interpreting federal law that give varying weight to circuit
and district court decisions. See Donald H. Zeigler, Gazing into the Crystal Ball: Reflections on the Standards State Judges Should Use to Ascertain Federal Law, 40 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1143, 1151–68 (1999) (surveying cases).
198 A state court may choose to avoid forum shopping by following circuit precedent as a matter of comity. See Szewczyk v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 881 A.2d 259, 266 n.11
(Conn. 2005) (“Departure from Second Circuit precedent on issues of federal law . . .
should be constrained in order to prevent the plaintiff’s decision to file an action in
federal District Court rather than a state court located a few blocks away from having
the bizarre consequence of being outcome determinative.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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trines. Fragmenting Erie into its components would thus reveal doctrinal connections that a less nuanced account of Erie obscures.
Another possibility is that vertical choice of law analysis really is
unique, such that Erie’s prioritization inquiry should depart from prioritization inquiries in other contexts. But if so, a second puzzle
arises.
2. The Puzzle of Pedigree: Why After Erie Do Courts Still
Distinguish Between Statutes and Common Law?
The second puzzle arises from a literal reading of the Supremacy
Clause. If we posit that federal law is always supreme relative to state
law, then Erie’s creation and interpretation components completely
supplant its prioritization component. The conclusion that federal
law exists and encompasses a disputed issue inexorably leads to the
further conclusion that federal law preempts inconsistent state law. In
effect, there is no prioritization inquiry because federal law always has
priority. The same conclusion would extend to bottom-up cases: if an
issue in state court is within the scope of a valid federal rule, the federal rule would preempt state law. Accordingly, prioritization in the
vertical context would be much simpler than in the horizontal context, so courts would be justified in not having one doctrine borrow
from the other.
The problem is that Erie’s prioritization inquiry does not in fact
rely on a literal reading of the Supremacy Clause. Erie does not simply
accord automatic priority to valid federal rules that encompass a disputed issue. Instead, the inquiry is more subtle.
Under current Erie jurisprudence, priority depends on a federal
rule’s pedigree. A federal rule that arises directly from the Constitution or a statute applies automatically under the Supremacy Clause.199
Automatic priority also extends to rules that the Supreme Court
promulgates under the Rules Enabling Act.200 In contrast, when federal courts create federal common law without congressional authorization, priority is no longer automatic. Substantive federal common
law applies automatically in the rare instances when it is relevant in
199 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 584 (1964) (“When there is an unavoidable
conflict between the Federal and a State Constitution, the Supremacy Clause of
course controls.”); Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 (1988) (“[A] district
court sitting in diversity must apply a federal statute that controls the issue before the
court and that represents a valid exercise of Congress’ constitutional powers.”).
200 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965) (equating the “validity” of an
FRCP provision with its “applicability” in diversity cases).
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diversity actions.201 But procedural federal common law’s priority
depends on a fuzzy balancing test. In this “relatively unguided Erie
choice” the Court must consider Erie’s “twin aims,” which are “discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.”202 A “federal judge-made law” that would “disserve”
these twin aims yields to conflicting state law.203
The emphasis on pedigree survives the Court’s recent fragmented decision in Shady Grove.204 Justice Scalia’s majority opinion
concluded that rules authorized under the REA “automatically” displace state law unless they are “invalid” under the REA or “inapplicable” because the issue is outside the rule’s scope.205 The majority did
not consider how Erie treated procedural common law given its conclusion that the REA applied, but a plurality obliquely endorsed the
twin aims test by noting that “judge-made rules” that cause “forum
shopping” cannot displace state law.206 Justice Stevens’s concurrence
acknowledged that “the way that [Erie] is administered varies depending upon whether there is a federal rule addressed to the matter.”207
He agreed that judge-made federal rules trigger the twin aims test and
that valid rules promulgated under the REA apply to cases within their
scope, although he disagreed with how the majority analyzed validity
201 Diversity actions by definition do not “aris[e] under” federal law or else they
would be federal question actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006). However, substantive federal law can control defenses, counterclaims, crossclaims, and third-party
claims in diversity actions. See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009) (stating
that jurisdiction under § 1331 is appropriate only when federal law is part of a “wellpleaded complaint”). Courts give valid substantive federal law automatic priority in
diversity actions where the issue is within the federal rule’s scope. See, e.g., Altria Grp.,
Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 80 (2008) (noting that a federal statute raised defensively in
a diversity action would preempt state law under the Supremacy Clause if the statute’s
text covered the disputed issue); Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512
(1988) (holding that a federal common law defense preempted state law in a diversity
action).
202 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468, 471; see also Stewart, 487 U.S. at 27 n.6 (stating that the
“twin aims” test applies to “federal judge-made law” when “no federal statute or Rule
covers the point in dispute”).
203 Stewart, 487 U.S. at 27 n.6.
204 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010).
205 Id. at 398.
206 Id. at 416 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). Additional dicta implied a skeptical
view of federal common law’s validity, but did not deny that federal common law
could displace state law in appropriate circumstances. See id. (“[W]here neither the
Constitution, a treaty, nor a statute provides the rule of decision or authorizes a federal court to supply one, state law must govern because there can be no other law.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
207 Id. at 417 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
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and scope.208 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent also emphasized pedigree,
noting that
[i]f a Federal Rule controls an issue and directly conflicts with state
law, the Rule, so long as it is consonant with the Rules Enabling Act,
applies in diversity suits. If, however, no Federal Rule or statute governs the issue . . . federal courts, in diversity cases, [must] apply state
law when failure to do so would invite forum-shopping and yield
markedly disparate litigation outcomes.209

The current test for implementing Erie’s prioritization component thus relies on a potentially applicable federal law’s pedigree. If
the Constitution, a valid federal statute, or a valid federal rule promulgated under the REA encompass an issue, then federal law applies
automatically regardless of whether and why there is a conflict with
state law. The same priority extends to substantive federal common
law. But if federal procedural common law conflicts with state law,
then priority hinges on the twin aims inquiry.
The puzzle is why this emphasis on pedigree makes any sense. It
seems to ignore the Supremacy Clause and it draws a line between
statutes and common law for little apparent reason, replicating one of
the formalities that plagued Swift.210
A complete account of why the pedigree rule is flawed—as well as
potential defenses of the rule and alternative readings of the
Supremacy Clause—is beyond the scope of this Article. I address the
problem in more depth in a work in progress devoted entirely to the
pedigree issue.211
For present purposes it suffices to observe that fragmenting Erie
into its components highlights interlocking puzzles about the prioritization inquiry. Either prioritization is essentially automatic, and thus
the pedigree rule is flawed, or prioritization requires a nuanced analysis, and thus Erie should consider doctrine from analogous choice of
law contexts.
D. Adoption
The adoption inquiry raises the tricky problem of how federal
courts should determine the content of laws that they did not create,
but are required to apply faithfully. This final component of Erie is
208 Id. at 417–18.
209 Id. at 438–39 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
210 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842) (distinguishing “enactments
promulgated by the legislative authority” and “decisions of the local tribunals”).
211 See Allan Erbsen, Erie and Procedural Common Law (unpublished work in progress) (on file with author).
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relevant when the other three components indicate that federal law
does not govern a particular question. If a federal court cannot apply
federal law and yet still has jurisdiction over a justiciable dispute, it
must adopt rules from other sources to fill the void.212
The context in which Erie analysis occurs complicates the intrinsically difficult process of adopting legal rules. A court applying Erie is
considering more than just how to identify and articulate the applicable law, which are questions that theorists have debated for centuries.
The court is also considering how an institution empowered by one
government (the federal government) should identify and articulate
law created and developed by the institutions of a different government (a state).
The Erie opinion provides minimal guidance about the adoption
inquiry, stating only that when federal law does not exist or lacks priority “the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State” as provided by “statute” or the state’s “highest court.”213 This thinly
reasoned assertion overlooks several questions that have spawned
enduring puzzles. Among the interesting questions are which state’s
law applies and what rules govern federal inquiries into the content of
that state’s law. Analyzing these questions in light of the distinction
between creation, interpretation, prioritization, and adoption can
help resolve confusion arising from Erie’s imprecision.
1. The Puzzle of Which State’s Law Applies: Klaxon and the
Adoption of Non-Federal Law
Erie is enervating, but Klaxon is exasperating. In a nutshell,
Klaxon214 holds that federal courts in diversity cases apply the choice
of law rules of the states in which they sit.215 The many flaws and
potential defenses of Klaxon’s holding have been thoroughly discussed elsewhere.216 Rather than repeat the debate, I will highlight
212 Federal courts may dismiss a case when there is no “judicially manageable standard” for resolving the dispute, and thus in a sense no governing law. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 291 (2004) (plurality opinion); id. at 278 (“[J]udicial action must
be governed by standard, by rule.”). However, concluding that a case is nonjusticiable
for lack of an applicable rule requires interpreting the Constitution’s provisions governing the judiciary’s role within a system of separated powers, such that federal law
still governs the outcome of adjudication. See id.
213 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
214 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
215 See infra notes 237–39 and accompanying text.
216 See, e.g., FALLON ET AL., supra note 77, at 566–69; Baxter, supra note 119, at
32–42; Samuel Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law: Choice of Law
After the Class Action Fairness Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1839, 1851–57 (2006). Klaxon
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how a nuanced fragmentation of Erie into its components highlights
errors in Klaxon’s assumptions and reasoning.
Understanding Klaxon requires revisiting Erie. The relevant analytical move in Erie was its observation that federal courts have only
two initial places to look for governing law: all law is state law unless
federal law applies.217 This binary arrangement does not bar federal
courts from subsequently considering foreign or international law, or
even private agreements. Instead, Erie limits their application to circumstances where state or federal law includes choice of law principles that select rules from an extrinsic source.218 Using my
terminology from Part I, Erie first selects an authoritative government
(a state), then selects an authoritative institution within that government (such as the highest court), and then identifies rules—from
whatever source—that the authoritative institution would choose to
apply. This methodology also explains why the laws of multiple states
can be relevant in a particular case. If the initially selected state government would apply rules from other states, then Erie generally
requires federal courts to do the same.219
may also exacerbate critiques of Erie by preventing federal courts from avoiding the
application of parochial laws that undermine national interests. See MICHAEL S.
GREVE, THE UPSIDE-DOWN CONSTITUTION 242 (2012) (contending that Erie facilitates
“state exploitation of interstate commerce”).
217 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (“Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution
or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State.”); see
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471–72 (1965) (observing that after Erie, “neither
Congress nor the federal courts can, under the guise of formulating rules of decision
for federal courts, fashion rules which are not supported by a grant of federal authority contained in Article I or some other section of the Constitution; in such areas state
law must govern because there can be no other law”).
218 See, e.g., Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4 (1975) (per
curiam) (Klaxon prevented a federal court from ignoring the forum state’s choice of
law rules even though they might require applying the law of a seemingly disinterested foreign nation); Kohler v. Leslie Hindman, Inc., 80 F.3d 1181, 1184–85 (7th Cir.
1996) (applying Klaxon to determine enforceability of a contractual choice of law
clause).
219 A complication arises if the two interested states would defer to each other.
Suppose that a federal court in state X adjudicates a diversity action between citizens
of states X and Y. Klaxon requires applying X’s choice of law rule, which favors applying Y’s law. But Y’s law includes a choice of law rule that would favor applying X’s law.
Neither state seems interested in providing an answer to the disputed question, yet
the federal court must apply law from one of them. For a discussion of this scenario
and a proposed solution, see Kermit Roosevelt III, Resolving Renvoi: The Bewitchment of
Our Intelligence by Means of Language, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1821, 1861–64 (2005).
Additional puzzles arise when courts must determine the “extrajurisdictional effect”
of state choice of law rules. Michael Steven Green, Law’s Dark Matter, 54 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 845, 869 (2013).
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Parsing Erie’s choice of “law” inquiry into three choices—choice
of government, institution, and rule—highlights the key question:
When potentially applicable rules conflict, and none of those rules
constitute federal law, which government has an authoritative claim to
supply criteria controlling the choice: the United States or a state? To
reach this question, a court must have already concluded that federal
law does not provide a rule regulating a disputed issue, based on analysis of Erie’s creation, interpretation, and prioritization components.220 Resolving the disputed issue therefore requires adopting a
non-federal rule. But the court needs to know where to look for that
non-federal rule, which requires identifying the government responsible for providing choice of law criteria.
Sometimes the answer to the “which government provides the
choice of law rule?” question is obvious. For example, the Constitution creates a federal choice of law rule in the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.221 Courts adjudicating interstate disputes can thus look to
federal law to help choose an applicable state law, although in practice the federal rule as currently interpreted imposes only minimal
constraints on otherwise applicable state choice of law principles.222 A
federal choice of law rule would also apply when Congress requires a
particular choice by statute.223
The “which government?” question is more subtle when the Constitution is silent and Congress has not acted. Nevertheless, federal
common law rules can still govern choice of law even if federal law
cannot supply the ultimate rule of decision. The relevance of federal
law may seem counterintuitive. After all, if federal interests are sufficient to justify creating federal common law to govern choice of law,
then they will often be sufficient to justify a federal substantive rule.
220 If federal law does control an issue, state law could still apply if either federal
common law or a federal statute incorporates state rules. The greater power to preempt state law includes the lesser power to incorporate it. For examples of statutes
incorporating state law, see 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006) (state liability rules govern tortious conduct by federal actors); 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A) (2006) (state law governs
portions of the “outer Continental Shelf”); 16 U.S.C. § 457 (2006) (state wrongful
death and personal injury laws apply “within a national park or other place subject to
the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States”); 40 U.S.C. § 3172(a) (2006) (state
workers’ compensation laws apply on federal “land and premises”); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2014(hh) (2006) (state law governs “public liability actions” arising from a “nuclear
incident” within the state); 18 U.S.C. §§ 7, 13(a) (2006) (state criminal law applies in
federal “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction”).
221 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
222 See supra subsection III.B.1.
223 For examples of federal statutes governing choice of law, see supra note 220.
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However, several types of cases might warrant federal choice of
law standards without authorizing broader lawmaking authority. First,
in some bankruptcy cases, federal courts must choose between conflicting state laws affecting the estate’s assets and the validity of claims.
This choice implicates federal interests in the estate’s disposition that
could justify federal choice of law criteria.224 Second, when federal
jurisdiction exists only because a party is a federally chartered corporation, federal interests might favor a neutral choice of law rule to
accompany the neutral forum even if state law otherwise applies.225
Third, in rare cases when federal courts must choose between state
law and tribal law, federal interests in protecting tribal autonomy may
warrant using federal rather than state choice of law criteria.226
Finally, in cases implicating foreign relations, federal interests arguably justify displacing state choice of law rules with a federal rule.227
The question then becomes, do diversity cases fall into the category where federal common law supplies a choice of law rule even
when federal law cannot govern the merits? The answer is yes,
although it does not necessarily follow that federal courts should create a uniquely federal choice of law rule rather than adopting choice
of law rules from state governments.
Identifying the institutional source of choice of law rules in diversity cases must be a federal question. Any other approach would be
circular given Erie’s premise that all initially authoritative law derives
from federal or state sources. If federal sources do not determine
224 See Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 161 (1946)
(noting that “the question of which particular state’s law should measure the obligation [to pay creditors] seldom lends itself to simple solution” and suggesting in dicta,
without citing the law of any state, that general choice of law principles might apply).
225 Compare Berger v. AXA Network LLC, 459 F.3d 804, 809–10 (7th Cir. 2006)
(suggesting that federal common law displaces state choice of law rules in federal
question cases when jurisdiction is based on party status), with A.I. Trade Fin., Inc. v.
Petra Int’l Banking Corp., 62 F.3d 1454, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (applying forum state’s
choice of law rule in action against a federally chartered corporation under 12 U.S.C.
§ 632).
226 Cf. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 19 (1987) (holding that plaintiffs
in diversity cases arising from conduct on a reservation must exhaust tribal court
remedies).
227 See Donald Earl Childress III, When Erie Goes International, 105 NW. U. L. REV.
1531, 1537 (2011) (advocating development of “specialized federal common law in
international conflict-of-laws cases”); Daniel C.K. Chow, Limiting Erie in a New Age of
International Law: Toward a Federal Common Law of International Choice of Law, 74 IOWA
L. REV. 165, 169–70 (1988) (proposing a federal choice of law standard); John Norton
Moore, Federalism and Foreign Relations, 1965 DUKE L.J. 248, 286–87 (advocating
greater “scrutiny” and possible displacement of state choice of law rules in international cases).
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which state’s law initially applies then state law must supply the
answer. Yet one would have to consult the law of a particular state to
find that answer. There is no way to know which state to consult without already having an answer to the question being asked. Treating
the initial choice of law determination as a federal question is therefore a logical necessity.
If choice of law in diversity cases must be a federal question, then
the next issue is which federal institution creates federal choice of law
rules. Congress could do so as a necessary and proper means of
implementing its power to vest diversity and supplemental jurisdiction
in “inferior” federal courts that it “constitute[s],” “ordain[s],” and
“establish[es].”228 But Congress has not acted.229 Absent legislation,
federal common law controls to fill the void.
One could even go further and argue that federal common law
directly implements the Diversity Clause. As I have explained elsewhere, diversity jurisdiction may exist in part to mitigate interstate friction that would arise if state courts adjudicated cases affecting sister
states. Treating the initial choice of state law as a federal question can
mitigate friction by having a neutral decisionmaker determine how to
prioritize the competing states’ regulatory interests.230 Whether this
analysis means that a particular federal rule is constitutionally
228 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8; art. III, § 1. “Scholars are virtually unanimous in their
view that Congress has the power to enact federal choice of law statutes.” Michael H.
Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80
GEO. L.J. 1, 23 (1991).
229 The RDA does not provide a viable choice of law rule for diversity cases. See
supra Section II.A. Before authorizing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Congress
had promulgated narrow choice of law rules governing procedure in federal actions
at law, including diversity cases. See, e.g., Conformity Act of June 1, 1872, Pub. L. No.
42-196, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196 (requiring federal courts to “conform, as near as may
be” to the forum state’s laws governing “practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of
proceeding”).
230 See Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, supra note 140, at 539–42; see also Hart, supra
note 9, at 515 (“The Rules of Decision Act says that ‘the laws of the several states’ are
to be followed only ‘in cases where they apply.’ The federal courts are in a peculiarly
disinterested position to make a just determination as to which state’s laws ought to
apply where this is disputed.”); Laycock, supra note 120, at 282 (“Unwillingness to
displace state authority even over choice-of-law rules largely defeats the policy of the
diversity jurisdiction.”); Roosevelt, supra note 8, at 23 (“The relative priority of two
states’ laws is a question on which no single state can be authoritative.”); Donald T.
Trautman, Toward Federalizing Choice of Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1715 (1992) (discussing
the possible origin, content, and scope of federal choice of law rules). Creating a
federal choice of law rule would raise difficult questions about what choices the rule
should make. For examples of specific proposals, see Baxter, supra note 119, and
Michael I. Krauss, Product Liability and Game Theory: One More Trip to the Choice-of-Law
Well, 2002 BYU L. REV. 759.
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required is debatable.231 But the virtues of a federal rule may assuage
any unease about the logical necessity of relying on federal law.
Even though federal law must govern choice of law in diversity
cases, Erie and Klaxon never directly engage the federal common law
nature of the inquiry. In Erie, the Court overlooked the problem
entirely. Its binary distinction between federal law and state law is misleading because there is no such thing as “state law.” Instead there
are fifty different bodies of law associated with fifty specific states.
Courts need to know not just that a state’s law applies, but which
state’s law applies. Justice Brandeis finessed this distinction by writing
that federal courts must apply the law of “the State” without explaining how to identify that state.232 The Court presumed that Pennsylvania law applied without purporting to rely on any particular
source of choice of law principles. That presumption was reasonable
because the accident had occurred in Pennsylvania and injured a
Pennsylvania resident. But the Erie case had been filed in the Southern District of New York rather than in Pennsylvania, so it was unclear
whether the Court applied Pennsylvania law due to a federal preference or deference to New York’s choice of law rules.233
Interestingly, Justice Story made the opposite omission in Swift.
While Erie never mentioned forum law, Swift focused only on forum
law. The forum (New York) was where the defendant was a citizen
and the bill of exchange was “accepted.”234 But the plaintiff was a
citizen of Maine, where the bill of exchange had been “dated” and the
land was located.235 The Swift opinion never explains why Maine’s law
did not apply. Like Justice Brandeis, Justice Story apparently believed
that the correct choice of law was so obvious that identifying the
source and content of rules governing the inquiry was unnecessary.
Swift’s focus on New York law is consistent with an earlier decision by
Justice Story applying the law of the place of contracting to cases
involving negotiable instruments. In that case, Justice Story relied on
a “well settled” choice of law rule within the “code of national law in
231 A related and difficult question is whether a federal choice of law rule should
apply only in federal court or also in state court. A preemptive rule would better
promote national uniformity but would further intrude on state prerogatives and
require rethinking the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s currently minimal constraints
on horizontal choice of law.
232 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
233 New York’s choice of law rules in 1938 would probably have required applying
Pennsylvania law. See Georgene M. Vairo, Multi-Tort Cases: Cause for More Darkness on
the Subject, or a New Role for Federal Common Law?, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 167, 181 n.66
(1985).
234 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 1, 14–15 (1842).
235 Id. at 1, 14.
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all civilized countries.”236 It is difficult to imagine Justice Brandeis
endorsing a choice of law framework with this sort of freewheeling
pedigree, yet his opinion in Erie does not indicate what he had in
mind to replace Swift-era choice of law methodology.
In the wake of Erie’s imprecise reference to laws of “the” state, the
Court needed to fashion a rule for identifying a specific state. It did
so in Klaxon.
With two paragraphs of analysis, the Court held in Klaxon that
federal district courts must apply the forum state’s choice of law
rules.237 The Court reasoned that any other rule “would do violence
to the principle of uniformity within a state, upon which [Erie] is
based.”238 If “the accident of diversity of citizenship” allowed federal
and state courts “sitting side by side” to apply different laws, plaintiffs
(by filing) and defendants (by removing) would forum shop for
favorable rules, undermining the “equal administration of justice”
within the state.239 The Court’s concerns are plausible, but its analysis
is incomplete.
Several flaws mitigate the Klaxon rule’s potential advantages. For
example, the decision avoids intrastate forum shopping at the cost of
encouraging interstate forum shopping,240 undermines predictability
in national markets by denying repeat players in interstate disputes
access to uniform choice of law rules, and ignores the federal interest
in resolving competing state claims of regulatory authority.241
Whatever the merit of these policy driven critiques,242 which commen236 Van Reimsdyk v. Kane, 28 F. Cas. 1062, 1063 (C.C.D.R.I. 1812) (No. 16,871).
237 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496–97 (1941).
238 Id. at 496.
239 Id.
240 The broad scope of adjudicative jurisdiction facilitates this forum shopping
while weak restraints on horizontal choice of law encourage it. See Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (requiring only “minimum contacts” between
the defendant and the forum to justify jurisdiction); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449
U.S. 302 (1981) (plurality opinion) (permitting Minnesota’s tangential contacts with
a case to allow Minnesota law to govern an insurance policy issued in Wisconsin to a
Wisconsin resident injured in Wisconsin by Wisconsin residents).
241 Federal interests are also relevant in alienage cases where courts must choose
between domestic and foreign law. A federal common law rule designed for interstate cases might not be appropriate for international cases implicating foreign relations. See supra note 227.
242 Other flaws are more technical. For example, after Klaxon choice of law rules
from an initial forum follow a transferred case to a new forum even if the original
forum had no connection to the dispute. A creative plaintiff can shop for favorable
law by filing in an inconvenient district and then seeking a transfer to a preferred
district. This occurred in Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990), where the
Court held that Mississippi law governed a claim against a Delaware Corporation by a
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tators have discussed elsewhere,243 I want to focus on a different flaw
related to the source of authority animating Klaxon.
A strange feature of Klaxon is that the Court did not seem to realize that it was creating federal common law. Despite Erie’s admonition for courts to be conscious of the sources of authority on which
they rely, Klaxon does not expressly ground its holding in any source.
Klaxon merely purports to “extend[ ]” Erie.244 Worse, Klaxon stated
that the alternative to relying on the forum’s choice of law rules would
be “enforcing an independent ‘general law’ of conflict of laws.”245
This framing of the problem is wrong. As Section III.A explained,
when federal courts incorporate general principles of law into federal
common law, those general principles cease to be “independent”
sources of authority of the type applied in Swift. The actual alternative to state law in Klaxon was not general law, but federal law. And it
was not really an alternative because the Klaxon rule is itself federal
common law. Klaxon is thus thoroughly muddled: it creates federal
law under the guise of adopting state law based on an irrelevant fear
of applying general law.
Closer attention to Erie’s distinct components might have provided clearer reasoning and a sounder rule. If the Court expressly
focused on the source of choice of law rules in federal court, it should
have realized that it was creating federal law and exercised the caution
that Erie’s creation component required. A cautious approach might
have inspired more extensive consideration of federal interests relevant to the adoption of non-federal law. For example, Klaxon might
Pennsylvania resident injured in Pennsylvania. The plaintiff had initially filed the
action in Mississippi to avoid Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations and then successfully sought a transfer to Pennsylvania. Likewise, Klaxon’s focus on the forum state’s
law is unstable when one realizes that the Constitution’s broad grant of power to
create and regulate inferior federal courts does not require Congress to establish single-state districts, see U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, and Congress has in fact created multistate
districts, see 28 U.S.C. § 131 (2006) (providing that the District of Wyoming includes
“portions of Yellowstone National Park situated in Montana and Idaho”); Judiciary
Act of 1801, ch. 4, § 21, 2 Stat. 89, 96 (creating the short-lived “district of Potomac,”
which included parts of Maryland and Virginia, as well as what is now the District of
Columbia). Identifying the forum state for a diversity action in a multistate district
would require applying the district’s internal rules assigning cases to various divisions.
These housekeeping rules are not a plausible foundation on which to rest a choice of
law inquiry. See Hill, supra note 103, at 558 (contending that the Klaxon rule would
be “intolerable” in a multistate district). Klaxon is thus more an artifact of the federal
judiciary’s current structure than a normative account of how choice of law should
operate in diversity cases.
243 See supra note 216.
244 Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496.
245 Id.
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have given greater thought to the possibility that if a neutral decisionmaker is desirable in diversity cases, then a neutral choice of law
rule might also be desirable. Federal courts therefore could apply a
uniform national choice of law rule that promotes federal interests
rather than relying on state choice of law rules that might privilege
parochial interests.246 But instead Klaxon simply incorporated the
forum state’s law, in effect prioritizing forum law over the laws of
other interested states without considering the availability of alternative rules.247 Klaxon’s imprecision and inattentiveness to alternatives
does not necessarily mean that adopting the forum state’s choice of
law rules is imprudent, but does suggest the need for careful reconsideration in light of Erie’s four components.248
2. The Puzzle of State Institutional Authority: Federal Common
Law and the Focus on States’ Highest Courts
A second puzzle related to the adoption of state law is that Erie is
internally inconsistent about the source of law determining the content of state rules. On one hand, Erie suggests that the optimal
method for interpreting state law is itself a question of state law. On
the other hand, Erie creates a federal common law rule requiring federal courts to interpret state law by predicting how the state’s highest
court would resolve an issue. This federal prediction rule is not necessarily consistent with state law governing the interpretative process.
Distinguishing Erie’s four components helps to highlight and resolve
246 See supra note 230. Applying a federal choice of law rule would still require
considering state choice of law rules. The federal rule would identify which state’s law
to apply, but a state’s choice of law rules are a component of its law that determines
how far state law extends. See Roosevelt, supra note 8, at 23 (“States have the power to
set the scope of their laws; federal courts do not.”).
247 Empirical analysis shows that the forum’s choice of law rules tend to favor
forum law, although often not by large margins. See Stuart E. Thiel, Choice of Law and
the Home-Court Advantage: Evidence, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 291, 313–14 (2000); cf.
Christopher A. Whytock, Myth of Mess? International Choice of Law in Action, 84 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 719, 764–75 (2009) (suggesting that federal courts might not be biased in
favor of domestic law in transnational cases). In another article, I illustrate how
Klaxon’s preference for a bright line rule favoring forum law is inconsistent with the
more flexible approach that federal courts use when crafting common law in other
contexts. See Erbsen, supra note 78 (contrasting Klaxon and Kimbell Foods).
248 Questions arise under each component: (1) Can federal courts create a common law choice of law rule that operates either only in federal courts or also in state
courts, and does Congress have more flexibility in crafting choice of law rules than
does the judiciary? (2) What is the rule’s scope and content? (3) When does it take
priority over state choice of law rules? (4) If federal choice of law rules do not apply,
which state’s choice of law rules should a federal court adopt?
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the tension between Erie’s deference to state law and imposition of a
federal interpretative standard. Instead of emulating the analytical
methods of a state’s highest court, federal district courts should emulate a state’s trial courts, while federal appellate courts should emulate
a state’s highest court. This change in focus better respects state
choices about the relative authority of different state institutions.
After a federal court decides which state’s law to apply it must
identify the content of that law. This process of interpretation should
be faithful to Erie’s principles. To see why, recall from Part I that Erie
presumes that binding law has an authoritative source. When state
law is binding, the source of that law is a state institution, such as the
legislature or judiciary. Federal courts are not the kind of institution
that states empower to create state law.249 Any attempt by federal
courts to impose their own preferences about the content of state law
would violate Erie by replacing an authoritative source of law with an
unauthoritative source.250 Of course, some inconsistency between
249 State courts routinely observe that federal judicial decisions applying state law
are not binding precedent. See, e.g., 21st Century Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 213 P.3d
972, 980–81 (Cal. 2009) (concluding that a federal court’s prediction about what “this
court would likely hold” was “unpersuasive”); Aull v. Houston, 345 S.W.3d 232, 236
(Ky. Ct. App. 2010) (“We are not bound . . . by the federal court’s prediction.”).
A state statute could in theory attempt to authorize federal courts to create state
common law, which would raise at least two constitutional concerns. First, federal
courts exercise the “judicial Power of the United States,” not of the individual states.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. If that judicial power does not include authority to create
state law that binds the states, then state acquiescence is likely to be irrelevant. Cf.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850–51 (1986) (stating
that “consent and waiver” cannot evade the “structural principle” underlying “limitations imposed by Article III”); infra notes 252–53 and accompanying text (noting that
the judicial power permits federal courts in diversity cases to exercise the lawmaking
authority of state courts that federal jurisdiction displaces, but limiting its analysis to
lawmaking that governs only the pending case). Second, delegating the power to
create state law to non-state institutions would raise difficult due process questions.
Cf. United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 294 (1958) (upholding the federal
Assimilative Crimes Act, which criminalizes violations of state criminal law in federal
enclaves, and characterizing the statute as a “deliberate continuing adoption” of state
law rather than as a “delegation” of federal lawmaking power to states); David M.
Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647, 672–94 (1986) (considering due process objections under state constitutions to state laws delegating government power to private actors); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a
System of Separated Powers, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1457, 1485 n.160 (2000) (contending that
federal dynamic incorporation of state law is permissible but that federal delegation
of lawmaking power to a state would be unconstitutional).
250 The opposite scenario—where state courts create federal law that is contrary to
a decision of a district or circuit court—is less troubling if one interprets the Constitution (which does not itself establish any lower federal courts) to allow a role for state
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federal and state applications of state law is inevitable for the same
reasons that federal courts are inconsistent even when applying federal law: the process of interpretation can be subjective. But Erie still
sets a goal of faithfully applying state law rather than altering or disregarding it.
A complication arises when state institutions have never considered a question that Erie deems to fall within the ambit of state law. In
this scenario, one could posit either that state law exists but is not
clear, or that state law does not yet exist. If state law is merely unclear,
then the Erie problem differs only in degree from cases where there is
greater evidence—such as roughly analogous precedent—of how state
courts would resolve particular questions. The federal court would
not be creating state law so much as compiling it from wisps of prior
authority. But if state law does not exist because an authoritative institution has not yet created it or extended it to a new context, then
there arguably is no law for a federal court to apply unless the federal
court creates a rule. Categorizing that rule seems to require choosing
between two troubling possibilities. If the rule is federal common law,
it is inconsistent with the premise that state law applies. If the rule is
state law, then the federal court becomes a source of another sovereign’s laws. Yet state courts would not be obligated to follow this new
law,251 which then starts to resemble Swiftian general law: it lacks an
authoritative state source, is binding only in federal court, but is not
federal law.
This ethereal puzzle about when and how state law comes into
being is interesting, but there is a simple solution in the Erie context:
either state law governing burdens of persuasion explains how federal
courts should proceed or federal law allows federal courts to create
new rules. For example, suppose that in a run-of-the-mill tort action
in state court a party relies on a novel claim or defense that the state’s
courts have never addressed. A conclusion that state law does not
exist is akin to concluding that the party with the burden of persuasion has failed to provide a reason for ruling in their favor. The same
analysis would apply in federal court under Erie; parties making
unsupported arguments lose in federal court just as they do in state
court.
courts in the federal lawmaking process with the possibility of error correction in the
Supreme Court. Cf. Bellia, supra note 143 (discussing the role of state courts in creating federal common law). However, allowing state courts to depart from circuit and
district precedent creates a risk of forum shopping in federal question cases, suggesting a potential need for further constraints on state discretion. See supra note 197
and accompanying text.
251 See supra note 249.
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One might respond that state courts have a power that federal
courts lack: they can create new law if the novel argument is sensible.
Yet so too can federal courts. Article III provides that federal courts
can exercise “judicial Power” over cases and controversies within their
jurisdiction, which includes diversity actions.252 This authority to
resolve disputes is presumably at least coextensive with the authority
of the state courts that diversity jurisdiction supplants.253 There is no
reason to think that the Framers intended to prejudice parties compelled to litigate within federal diversity courts—such as defendants in
original actions and plaintiffs in removed actions—by denying them
access to new rules that state courts could create.
Article III thus allows federal courts to mirror the lawmaking flexibility of state courts. The label we use for the ensuing rules—“state
law,” “predicted state law,” or even “diversity law”—is irrelevant so
long as federal courts are clear about what they are doing and why
they are doing it. This law would not replicate Swiftian general law
because it would be tailored to the particular jurisdiction with authority to govern the dispute. The federal court would be trying to respect
existing and potential state law rather than trying to displace state law.
The interesting question then becomes how should a federal
court mirror state law. Erie’s prioritization inquiry considers the types
of state rules that federal courts should follow, while Erie’s adoption
inquiry considers which state institutions are authoritative sources of
those rules.
The Erie doctrine seems to create a sensible rule for considering
which institutions federal courts should emulate, but closer scrutiny
reveals that the current approach is inconsistent with Erie’s principles.
As currently applied, the Erie doctrine requires federal courts to ascertain the content of state law by predicting how the state’s highest
court would answer a question.254 Federal courts can therefore ignore
state intermediate appellate court and trial court decisions,255
252 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
253 In practice, federal authority might not precisely match state authority if the
two judicial systems use different procedures to resolve disputes. Whether Erie tolerates procedural variation between federal and state courts depends on its creation
component (testing whether federal procedures are valid), interpretation component
(testing whether federal procedures are applicable), and its prioritization component
(determining whether federal procedures displace inconsistent state procedures).
254 See 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4507 (2d ed. 2010) (collecting cases).
255 See Comm’r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967) (“[U]nder some conditions, federal authority may not be bound even by an intermediate state appellate
court ruling.”). Some circuits have relied on stare decisis to justify ignoring state
intermediate appellate decisions that reject the circuit’s own prior efforts to predict
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although in practice these will often be helpful evidence of what the
highest court would do.256 Federal judges apparently like this rule,
which prevents them from becoming a “ventriloquist’s dummy”
bound to repeat the holdings of lower state courts.257 The rule also
has intuitive appeal because a “State’s highest court is unquestionably
the ultimate expositor” on the content of existing law (although the
legislature can react to judicial decisions by altering the law).258 If the
highest state court will be the definitive authority after it decides a
question, then predicting how the highest court will rule before it
decides a question may provide the best chance of accurately foreshadowing the definitive content of unsettled state law. Nevertheless,
focusing on a state’s highest court is inappropriate under either of
two plausible justifications for the prediction rule.
The first potential justification for Erie’s prediction rule is that it
is consistent with how state law structures interpretative and lawmaking processes in state courts. On this view, when Erie instructs federal
judges to predict how the state’s highest court would rule, it is in
effect requiring the same inquiry that lower state courts would perthe content of state law. Compare FDIC v. Abraham, 137 F.3d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 1998)
(“[W]e should not disregard our own prior precedent on the basis of subsequent
intermediate state appellate court precedent unless such precedent comprises unanimous or near-unanimous holdings from several—preferably a majority—of the intermediate appellate courts of the state in question.”), and Reiser v. Residential Funding
Corp., 380 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that “[i]nstead of guessing over
and over [in response to intermediate state court decisions], it is best to stick with one
assessment” until the state’s highest court addresses the issue), with In re Watts, 298
F.3d 1077, 1082–83 (9th Cir. 2002) (following intermediate state court decisions that
rejected a prior Ninth Circuit precedent predicting state law).
256 See West v. AT&T Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940) (noting that courts should not
“disregard[ ]” intermediate appellate decisions absent “persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise”). In theory, a federal court could take
the prediction approach to its logical extreme by declining to follow even high court
precedents that it believes would be overruled. In practice, federal judges are
unlikely to make such bold predictions absent compelling evidence. See Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 205 (1956) (declining to ignore a forty-six-year-old
state high court opinion because “there appears to be no confusion in the Vermont
decisions, no developing line of authorities that casts a shadow over the established
ones, no dicta, doubts or ambiguities in the opinions of Vermont judges on the question, [and] no legislative development that promises to undermine the judicial rule”).
257 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 254, § 4507.
258 Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406, 425 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Despite the Court’s use of “unquestionably,” one can question the origins of this rule
because the Court has not explained whether it emanates from federal common law
or state law. See Fid. Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 177 (1940) (citing Erie,
without any explanation, as supporting the proposition that “[t]he highest state court
is the final authority on state law”).
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form. If so, then the prediction rule is consistent with Erie’s goal of
not distorting state law.
As Abbe Gluck recently explained, the “method” by which state
courts interpret law is often as much a part of state law as the laws
being interpreted.259 Law is not merely a set of words arranged in a
particular way, but also a set of techniques for animating and applying
those words. Professor Gluck was focusing on the interpretation of
statutes, but the same principle applies to the creation and refinement
of common law. When state courts make common law they do so
because state law allows them to do so within certain limits. Just as the
Constitution’s separation of powers affects the allocation and scope of
federal lawmaking authority, the division of lawmaking power within a
state determines which state institutions (including different types of
courts) are authoritative sources of particular rules. The allocation
and scope of that authority must itself be a question of state law
because state law creates and structures state institutions. The Constitution imposes some limits on how state institutions operate—for
example, the Due Process Clause precludes arbitrary lawmaking—but
otherwise states generally have autonomy in deciding how to internally allocate lawmaking authority.260
Accordingly, the basic legal process question of “who decides” the
content of state law is itself a question of state law when Erie deems
state law to be authoritative and there is no federal constraint on state
discretion (such as a due process limit).261 This reasoning suggests
that federal courts should determine the content of state common law
using the same method as state courts.262
259 Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the
Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1930 (2011).
260 Federal law occasionally requires states to exercise their authority in particular
ways, but generally does not dictate how states allocate authority between the legislative and judicial branches. See Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 922 n.13 (1997) (“We
have made it quite clear that it is a matter for each State to decide how to structure its
judicial system.”); Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 111 (1994) (holding that the Due
Process Clause required a state to provide a remedy to plaintiffs challenging a tax, but
noting that “choices” about how to configure a “remedial scheme” are “generally a
matter only of state law”).
261 The “who decides” question has a different answer when federal courts incorporate state law into federal law, at which point state law need not have the same
meaning as it would have in state court, although uniform interpretation would still
be prudent. See supra notes 9, 13–15 and accompanying text.
262 Other kinds of methods and institutional arrangements that are incidental to
the lawmaking process may receive less deference. For example, the federal government has an interest in defining which federal institutions make factual determinations in diversity cases. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 438
(1996) (citing “practical reasons” and the “Seventh Amendment” as justifications for
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The problem with justifying the prediction rule as a reflection of
actual state practice is that the Court has never tried to confirm if this
account of state practice is correct, and the account appears wrong in
some states. Soon after Erie, the Court examined South Carolina law
to determine whether federal courts should follow the decisions of the
state’s Court of Common Pleas. The Supreme Court concluded that
state law did not deem these trial court decisions binding on other
state courts, but expressed caution about creating “a general rule”
governing federal emulation of state trial courts because of variations
in how “other states” structure their judicial systems.263 Yet subsequent cases ignored this warning, creating a prediction rule without
tying that rule to the actual practices of state courts under state law.264
This omission is troubling because trial courts in some states do not
always attempt to predict how the state’s highest court would rule and
are instead bound by other sources of authority, such as intermediate
appellate decisions.265 In these states the federal prediction rule
allowing trial courts to find facts rather than following a state rule requiring appellate
fact finding); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537–38 (1958)
(holding that state law cannot “disrupt[ ] the federal system of allocating functions
between judge and jury”).
263 King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 333 U.S. 153, 162 (1948). A
prior decision had noted the importance of “applicable principles for determining
state law” without identifying what these were or where they came from. Meredith v.
Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 238 (1943).
264 See supra notes 255–56.
265 See, e.g., Grand Cnty. v. Rogers, 44 P.3d 734, 738 (Utah 2002) (“When the
[intermediate appellate court] renders a decision on an issue, that decision is automatically part of the law of this state, unless and until contravened by this court, the
legislature, or the people through the processes authorized for the making of new
law.”); State v. Washington, 114 So. 3d 182, 185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (“While a
lower court is free to disagree and to express its disagreement with an [intermediate]
appellate court ruling, it is duty-bound to follow it.”); People v. Cummings, 873
N.E.2d 996, 1003 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (“[D]ecisions of intermediate appellate courts
are the law of the state or jurisdiction until such decisions are reversed or overruled
by the court of last resort.”); Cuccia v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 796, 801 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2007) (noting that the trial court “has no choice” about following intermediate appellate authority, but can encourage the appellate court to overrule precedent);
Am. Disc. Corp. v. Shepherd, 120 P.3d 96, 102 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (“Where the
Supreme Court has not addressed an issue, an existing Court of Appeals decision is
the law that must be followed on the issue.”); Tebo v. Havlik, 343 N.W.2d 181, 185 n.2
(Mich. 1984) (“[A]n uncontradicted decision of the [intermediate appellate court]
must be followed by the circuit courts.”).
Even intermediate appellate courts in some states have a limited lawmaking
capacity. See Young v. Beck, 231 P.3d 940, 946 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that
only the state’s highest court can abrogate a common law doctrine); Simmons Airlines v. Lagrotte, 50 S.W.3d 748, 752 (Tex. App. 2001) (“It is not for an intermediate
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replaces state law governing lawmaking in trial courts with an alternative federal common law rule.266 This federal rule would be justified
only if it advances a federal interest, which leads to the second potential justification for the prediction rule.
The prediction rule might be appropriate because a federal
court’s choice of which state institution to emulate is a federal question requiring a federal common law rule (absent congressional
action). The Diversity Clause puts federal courts in a position where
they often must apply state law.267 Yet neither the Diversity Clause nor
anything else in the Constitution explicitly tells federal courts where
to look for answers about the content of state law, especially when
state courts have not definitively resolved a contested question. This
“where to look” inquiry must then be a question of federal common
law. Treating the inquiry as controlled by state law would be circular:
relying on state law as a source of rules about how to find the content
of state law is impossible if one does not already know where in state
law to look for such rules.268 Just as Klaxon avoids circularity by creating a federal common law rule regarding choice of an authoritative
government, the Erie doctrine’s prediction approach is a federal common law rule governing choice of an authoritative institution within
the selected government.
appellate court to undertake to enlarge or extend the grounds for wrongful discharge
under the employment-at-will doctrine.”); Stubbs v. N. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 448 N.W.2d
78, 81 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (“It is not . . . the function of this court to establish new
causes of action.”); Stanfill v. City of Richmond Heights, 605 S.W.2d 501, 505 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1979) (“court of error” cannot implement “change in the fundamental theory of
the law”).
266 At least one state trial court has observed, perhaps wistfully, that it lacked the
flexibility of its federal counterparts. See Chase Manhattan Bank v. N.H. Ins. Co., 749
N.Y.S.2d 632, 641 n.11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002) (“Unlike a lower New York court, a Federal court is not bound by the decisions of the Appellate Division, but is charged,
instead, with predicting how the New York Court of Appeals would rule on an issue.”).
267 Abstention is generally not an option even if state law issues are difficult. See
Meredith, 320 U.S. at 234 (stating that other than in “exceptional cases,” “the difficulties of ascertaining what the state courts may hereafter determine the state law to be
do not in themselves afford a sufficient ground for a federal court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction to decide a case which is properly brought to it for decision”).
268 Federal common law also governs the related question of how to allocate discretion among federal trial and appellate courts interpreting state law. Appellate
review is de novo. See Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991). The
extent to which an appellate prediction of state law binds federal trial courts varies
across circuits and by context (for example, a clear intervening change in state law
motivates some district courts to depart from circuit precedent). See Jed I. Bergman,
Note, Putting Precedent in Its Place: Stare Decisis and Federal Predictions of State Law, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 969, 992–95 (1996) (reviewing cases).
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However, even though federal courts can create a common law
rule governing which state institution to emulate, the current rule
requiring federal courts to emulate the state’s highest court is
unsound. First, there is no compelling reason that federal common
law governing the interpretation of state law should be nationally uniform.269 If federal diversity courts can apply fifty sets of tort and contract laws, then they can manage to apply fifty sets of laws governing
the allocation of authority between different levels of the state judiciary. A uniform interpretative method would not enhance the ability
of potential diversity litigants to anticipate outcomes and plan their
behavior because the underlying law would still differ in each state
due to Klaxon. Indeed, the current prediction rule might actually
complicate parties’ planning to the extent that it introduces a speculative variable into federal decisionmaking that is absent from decisionmaking in some state trial courts.
Second, although the prediction rule is a plausible method for
determining the content of state law, other methods are also plausible, such as consulting legal scholarship, expert witnesses, trial court
decisions, intermediate appellate court decisions, or a combination of
sources.270 Indeed, horizontal choice of law inquiries can resort to
multiple methods of ascertaining state law.271 Even when the Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses compel a state
court to apply the law of another state, there is no requirement that
the state court use Erie’s predictive approach.272 Nothing in the Diversity Clause or any other part of the Constitution suggests that the
methodology for ascertaining the content of law should differ in the

269 See supra note 12 (noting presumption favoring incorporation of state law into
federal common law).
270 For a general discussion of whether predicting a superior court’s decisions is a
sensible way of making law in light of alternative possibilities, compare Evan H.
Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1994) (defending a predictive approach), with Michael C.
Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 700–01 (1995) (criticizing
prediction approaches).
271 Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 136(2) cmt. d (1971)
(describing “methods of providing information as to content of foreign law”).
272 Some states voluntarily borrow the federal prediction rule. See, e.g., Fantis
Foods, Inc. v. N. River Ins. Co., 753 A.2d 176, 183 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000)
(“We see no reason why a different rule ought to govern state court judges in determining the law of a sister state than governs federal judges in identifying the law of
any state . . . .”); Lucero v. Valdez, 884 P.2d 199, 204 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (adopting
prediction rule by “analogiz[ing]” vertical and horizontal choice of law).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-2\NDL203.txt

2013]

unknown

ERIE’S FOUR FUNCTIONS

Seq: 77

19-FEB-14

12:43

655

vertical context from what is commonplace in the horizontal
context.273
Recent scholarship has challenged current practices in horizontal
choice of law by showing that state courts often ignore or misinterpret
laws from other states.274 The sensible solution is to extend into the
horizontal context Erie’s insight in the vertical context that courts are
obligated to apply foreign law with “fidelity” to how that law operates
in foreign courts.275 Yet the need for greater rigor in the horizontal
context does not mean that flaws in how Erie implements the fidelity
requirement should propagate from the vertical context.276 Federal
courts therefore should not be as lax in interpreting foreign law as are
some state courts, while state courts should not be as wedded to the
prediction approach as are federal courts. Instead, state and federal
courts should both treat foreign rules of interpretation as an aspect of
the foreign law being applied. Erie’s approach to ascertaining the
content of foreign law would thus have its roots in forum law without
being needlessly parochial.
Third, the prediction rule is not necessary to prevent federal
courts from becoming ventriloquists’ dummies for state trial courts.
State trial court decisions would bind federal courts only if they are
binding in other state trial courts, which is unlikely because generally
“[t]rial or inferior court decisions are not precedents binding other
courts, including . . . other judges of the same trial court.”277
273 In both contexts, the question is the same: having concluded that legal rules
from another government determine the answer to a disputed question, the court
must ascertain the content of those rules. If the relevant government is, say, California, there is no reason why a federal district court and state trial court located in
adjacent buildings in Texas must use different methods for identifying the applicable
California rule. The methods can differ, but the Constitution does not require any
difference.
274 See Green, supra note 14, at 1266–74.
275 Id. at 1262; see also id. at 1239 (“The obligations of a state court when interpreting sister-state law go to the heart of what it means to have fifty states cohabiting a
federal union.”).
276 See id. at 1248 n.59, 1251 (suggesting that the prediction rule is important, but
acknowledging that it is not an essential element of vertical Erie that state courts must
apply in lieu of viable alternative means of respecting sister-state law).
277 Ford v. Beaufort Cnty. Assessor, 730 S.E.2d 335, 339 n.3 (S.C. Ct. App. 2012)
(quoting 21 C.J.S. Courts § 212 (2006)); see also King v. Order of United Commercial
Travelers, 333 U.S. 153, 161 (1948) (“[I]t would be incongruous . . . to hold the
federal court bound by a decision [of a state trial court] which would not be binding
on any state court.”). A similar model operates in the federal judiciary, where “federal district judges, sitting as sole adjudicators, lack authority to render precedential
decisions binding other judges, even members of the same court.” Am. Elec. Power
Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2011).
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Finally, Erie’s emphasis on forum shopping illustrates why the current prediction rule fails to advance federal interests. In Erie the
Court focused extensively on the risk of forum shopping by litigants
hoping that federal courts would answer contested questions differently than state courts. Subsequent decisions confirm that preventing
forum shopping is one of Erie’s “twin aims”278 and that a federal court
sitting in diversity is “in effect . . . another court of the State.”279 If
preventing forum shopping is important, then the initial institution
that federal courts should emulate is the state trial court where the
action would have been filed if federal jurisdiction did not exist.280 By
instead emulating the state’s highest court, Erie creates an incentive to
forum shop. State trial courts at the bottom of the judicial hierarchy
typically have less discretion to depart from precedent or adopt novel
rules than courts at the top of the hierarchy. Parties might prefer to
file in or remove to a federal trial court masquerading as a state
supreme court rather than litigate in a state trial court behaving the
way that trial courts normally behave.
Of course, litigants in state court have one advantage that litigants in federal court do not: they can seek review in higher state
courts that have more flexibility than trial courts. Erie’s prediction
rule thus might make sense as a way of incorporating the powers of
state appellate courts into federal decisionmaking.
However, two alternative ways to incorporate the state appellate
process are superior to the current prediction rule. First, rather than
guessing what a state’s highest court might do, the federal court can
certify a question to the state’s highest court and receive a definitive
answer.281 Diversity cases raising difficult questions of unsettled state
278 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
279 Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
280 In theory, a complication would arise if states create multiple types of trial
courts with jurisdiction over cases where the amount in controversy exceeds the federal minimum. The federal court would then need to determine which type to emulate. This question of federal common law is not likely to arise because even if states
have several types of trial courts with jurisdiction that overlaps the district court, those
state courts presumably would employ similar methods for interpreting state law, obviating any choice between them.
281 See Dorf, supra note 270, at 700 (suggesting certification as an alternative to the
prediction rule); Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974) (noting that certification “save[s] time, energy, and resources and helps build a cooperative judicial
federalism”); Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and
Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1544–63 (1997) (discussing the
costs and benefits of certification in diversity cases). But see Jonathan Remy Nash,
Examining the Power of Federal Courts to Certify Questions of State Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
1672, 1741–48 (2003) (contending that certification is inappropriate in diversity cases

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-2\NDL203.txt

2013]

unknown

ERIE’S FOUR FUNCTIONS

Seq: 79

19-FEB-14

12:43

657

law in which the district court’s emulation of a trial court would disadvantage federal litigants are presumably rare and diffused across fifty
states. If so, no one state would bear a burdensome load of certification requests.282
Second, if a federal court is going to act like a state appellate
court, the acting should be done by a federal appellate court rather
than a federal trial court. In state judicial systems, appellate courts
can affirm or overrule decisions even if the trial court faithfully
applied existing state law because the appellate court typically has
more flexibility to create new law. If federal adjudication in diversity
cases should replicate the lawmaking process of state adjudication,
then federal appellate courts should emulate state appellate courts.283
Most states have two layers of appellate courts: intermediate and highest. A literal mapping of this structure onto the federal judiciary
would analogize the federal circuit courts to state intermediate courts
and the Supreme Court to a state’s highest court. However, the
Supreme Court almost never reviews questions of state law.284 This
means that if circuit courts emulate state intermediate courts, federal
courts will rarely have an opportunity to exercise the interpretative
flexibility of a state’s highest court. Federal common law should

due to the risk that state courts will bias their answers against out-of-state litigants).
Federal judges have varying attitudes toward certification, even within the same circuit. Compare Tinelli v. Redl, 199 F.3d 603, 606 n.5 (2d Cir. 1999) (“When there is
uncertainty in state law in a diversity case, it is often appropriate to certify the
unresolved question to the highest court of that state.”), with Dibella v. Hopkins, 403
F.3d 102, 111 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that certification is appropriate only in “exceptional circumstances”). The disagreement appears to stem from competing perceptions about when state law is sufficiently uncertain to justify burdening a state court
with a certification request. Apparently, uncertainty is in the eye of beholder.
282 Even courts in large states welcome certification requests. See Amberboy v.
Societe de Banque Privee, 831 S.W.2d 793, 798 n.9 (Tex. 1992) (“By answering certified questions for those federal appellate courts that are Erie-bound to apply Texas
law, we avoid the potential that the federal courts will guess wrongly on unsettled
issues, thus contributing to, rather than ameliorating confusion about the state of
Texas law. We find such cooperative effort to be in the best interests of an orderly
development of our own unique jurisprudence, and to the bar, as well as in the best
interests of the litigants we concurrently serve.”).
283 For discussion of an analogous question about the relative lawmaking powers
of federal trial and appellate courts in cases involving federal law, see Aaron-Andrew
P. Bruhl, Deciding When to Decide: How Appellate Procedure Distributes the Costs of Legal
Change, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 203 (2011).
284 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 254, § 4036 (“Federal court determinations of
state law are not binding on the Supreme Court. Nonetheless, the Court practices
severe restraint in reviewing questions of state law.”).
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therefore allow circuit courts to emulate a state’s highest court given
that both are essentially courts of last resort.285
In sum, the rule requiring federal courts in diversity cases to predict how the state’s highest court would resolve a disputed question is
not an appropriate exercise of the judiciary’s power to create federal
common law. By using an inappropriate method to ascertain the content of state law, Erie’s prediction rule undermines Erie’s commitment
to state authority. Instead, federal common law should require federal district courts in diversity cases to emulate state trial courts,286
which often but not always will involve predicting how the state’s high285 This rule may seem inefficient because it encourages litigants to appeal federal
district court decisions in the hope of obtaining review that is less constrained by state
precedent. However, the efficiency concern does not warrant a different rule. First,
my proposal replicates whatever inefficiency exists in state courts. If that inefficiency
is a byproduct of a state’s choice about how to allocate lawmaking authority among
different institutions, then Erie’s respect for this allocation and desire to avoid forum
shopping should borrow the bitter with the sweet. Second, the current approach to
Erie’s adoption component is already inefficient because federal appellate courts
review district court applications of state law de novo, which encourages appeals seeking a new audience. See supra note 268. The marginal increase in appeals under my
proposal is unlikely to be burdensome, especially given the prevalence of prejudgment settlement.
286 Requiring federal district courts to emulate state trial courts in diversity cases
raises a fascinating question that merits further scholarship: should the same emulation rule apply when federal courts consider state law outside the diversity context,
such as when considering supplemental state claims in federal question cases? See 28
U.S.C. § 1367 (2006); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (federal courts are “bound” by Erie in federal question cases). The two contexts at first
seem indistinguishable because both involve interpreting state law. However, forum
shopping for favorable interpretations of state law is less likely when the parties have
independent reasons to prefer a federal forum for a federal claim. Once in federal
court, preclusion and estoppel rules in effect require plaintiffs to join transactionally
related state claims and defendants to join compulsory state counterclaims. See FED.
R. CIV. P. 13(a); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25 cmt. e (1982). Moreover,
supplemental jurisdiction cases might warrant special treatment because federal
courts may approach state law differently when it is “woven into” a federal question
case rather than when it is part of a “head of federal jurisdiction which entails a
responsibility to adjudicate the claim on the basis of state law,” such as the Diversity
Clause. McNeese v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 673 & n.5 (1963) (discussing abstention); see also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 546 (1974) (noting that “[t]he Court
has characteristically dealt first with possibly dispositive state law claims pendent to
federal constitutional claims” as a means of avoiding difficult federal questions).
Potential methodological inefficiencies discussed above at note 285 might therefore
be more troubling in a federal question case than in a diversity case. Accordingly, the
difference between federal interests in the supplemental jurisdiction and diversity
contexts could in theory justify different interpretative methods, although further
scholarship would be needed before concluding that such confusing differences are
necessary in practice.
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est court would rule.287 Federal judges might prefer the current prediction approach. But the desire of federal trial judges to have more
flexibility than their state counterparts is not the sort of interest that
survives Erie’s limits on federal judicial authority.
The Court might have been able to avoid the flawed prediction
rule if it had focused more precisely on distinct components of Erie
analysis. Greater attention to the creation component would have
highlighted the need for caution when creating a uniform federal
common law rule governing methods of interpreting state law. More
attention to the adoption component would have highlighted the
need to rely on state law as a guide in selecting state institutions to
emulate. Likewise, thinking about Erie as involving three kinds of
choices—governments, institutions, and rules—rather than a single
choice of “law” would have revealed how a state’s allocation of authority among its judicial institutions might inform federal judicial efforts
to identify applicable rules.
CONCLUSION
This Article’s framework for thinking about the Erie doctrine provides a foundation for reconceptualizing choice of law in federal
courts. Fragmenting Erie into its components demystifies a doctrine
that otherwise seems to be an inscrutable monolith. The confusing
whole is the jumbled sum of its more easily understood parts.
Deflating Erie’s mystique does not diminish its importance. The
Erie doctrine’s four functions place it at the center of debates about
how to allocate regulatory power in a federal system and how to think
about the legitimacy of legal rules. Making progress in these debates
requires a more nuanced account of Erie than current jurisprudence
provides. Focusing on Erie’s four components can help resolve recurring doctrinal problems in vitally important areas of law that have confounded courts and scholars for seventy-five years.

287 Given that little is known about the varying limits on trial court discretion in
the fifty states, further research would be helpful in guiding the development of state
law in federal courts.

